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"IT'S NOT MY JOB TO CARE": UNDERSTANDING 
JUSTICE SCALINS METHOD OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION THROUGH SWEET HOME 
AND CHEVRON 
Karin P. Sheldon* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In his dissent to Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities 
for a Greater Oregon (Sweet Home),! Justice Antonin Scalia concluded 
that the destruction of the habitat of an endangered species does not 
harm that species within the meaning of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).2 He disagreed with a majority of the United States Supreme 
Court which upheld a twenty-five year old Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) regulation interpreting the ESA's prohibition against harming 
endangered species to include damage to their habitat.3 The regula-
tion applies to privately owned as well as public lands. Justice Scalia 
accused the majority of conscripting the lands of even "the simplest 
farmer" in the United States to "national zoological use."4 
Justice Scalia's Sweet Home dissent confirmed many environmen-
talists' convictions that Justice Scalia is either hopelessly ignorant of 
the basic principles of ecology, or does not care about the impact of 
government and industry activities upon air, water, wildlife and other 
* Associate Professor, Vermont Law School. J.D., University of Washington School of Law, 
1970; A.B., Vassar College, 1967. My thanks to Holly Wheeler for her skillful and enthusiastic 
assistance in researching this article. 
1 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2421 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
216 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
3 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995). 
4 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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natural resources. The dissent compounded the scorn environmental-
ists saw expressed in Justice Scalia's decisions in environmental stand-
ing cases in which he limited the ability of environmental plaintiffs to 
use the courts to help protect the environment.5 This scorn prompted 
Justice Blackmun to wonder if Justice Scalia believes that environ-
mental groups suffer some "special constitutional standing disabili-
ties,"6 and to accuse him of conducting a "slash and burn expedition 
through the law of environmental standing."7 It is easy to dismiss 
Justice Scalia as a result-oriented anti-environmentalist. It is much 
more important to understand his approach. Guiding the outcome in 
all his decisions is a consistent and comprehensive legal philosophy. 
Justice Scalia's opinions in environmental cases, although they have 
received little scholarly attention, provide particularly clear windows 
into his philosophy and methodology.8 They also reveal a great deal 
about his efforts to "maneuver"9 the Supreme Court and the law in 
the direction compatible with his strongly held views on the nature 
of our constitutional government and the role of the courts. 
Justice Scalia ignores the substantive consequences of his decisions 
on the environment because worrying about the environment is not 
his job. He believes that judges are the least suited members of the 
government to decide what is best for society as a whole, or its 
environment.1O Judges who allow their enthusiasm for environmental 
issues to interfere with an objective analysis of the statute or regula-
tion before them intrude improperly into the business of the legisla-
6 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 
U.S. 871 (1990). . 
6 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 595 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
7Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
8 Much has been written about Justice Scalia's opinions in other types of cases. For example, 
in 1991, an entire symposium was devoted to his jurisprudence, although he had been on the 
Supreme Court less than five years. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, My Pizza with Nino, 12 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1583 (1991). Among the most illuminating articles about Justice Scalia are those 
prepared by the Justice himself. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an 
Essential Ele7nent of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); Antonin 
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511; 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); Antonin Scalia, 
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
9 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, supra 
note 8, at 899. Justice Scalia uses the word "maneuvering" to describe the process he intends 
to follow to move the law of standing back to what he believes is its original intent under the 
Constitution. See infra Section III.B.2 for a discussion of other ways Justice Scalia is directing 
the law. 
10 See infra Section III.B.2. 
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tive and executive branches. For Justice Scalia, the majority's deci-
sion in Sweet Home is an example of just such judicial error. 
The issue in Sweet Home was the proper interpretation of Section 
9 of the Endangered Species Act which makes it unlawful for any 
person to "take" a species subject to the Act.1l "Take" is defined in 
the statute to include "harm," as well as capture, kill, wound and other 
words prohibiting the direct application of force against animals.12 
Regulations of the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS) interpret "harm" to include modification of the habitat 
of protected species that results in injury or death to members of 
those species.13 The regulation reaches activities on private as well as 
public lands. It was challenged by a group of timber companies and 
landowners who alleged that it exceeded the authority of the ESA.14 
To decide the issue, the Supreme Court applied the rule announced 
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC (Chevron)15 that a court must defer 
to an agency's permissible construction of the ambiguous language of 
a statute that the agency administers.16 The court may not substitute 
its judgment for the agency's policy choices.17 
A majority of the Supreme Court found the statutory language 
defining "take" to be ambiguous and deferred to the FWS's regulation 
as a permissible interpretation of the statutory language.1s The Court 
concluded that Congress intended to protect and conserve both en-
dangered species and the ecosystems on which they depend, regard-
less of whether the habitat is privately or publicly owned.19 The Court 
based its ruling on the "ordinary meaning" of the word "harm," the 
sweeping purposes of the ESA, and its legislative history.20 
Justice Scalia, by contrast, found Congress's intent "unmistakably 
clear," eliminating any need to defer to the FWS's regulation or even 
to consider whether it was a reasonable interpretation of the purposes 
of the ESA.21 To Justice Scalia, the ordinary meaning of "take," as 
11 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(I). 
12 [d. § 1532(19). 
13 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995). 
14 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2410 
(1995). 
15 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
16 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2416 (applying Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866). 
17 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
18 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2416. 
19 [d. at 2415. 
20 [d. at 2412-14, 2416. 
21 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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determined by the structure and context of the ESA, and the body of 
wildlife law into which it fits, is restricted to hunting or killing of 
animals, not the modification of their habitat.22 Habitat protection is 
to be achieved only through land acquisition and limits on what fed-
eral agencies are permitted to do on public lands.23 Private landowners 
bear no obligation to avoid damaging the habitat of protected spe-
cies.24 
This article examines Justice Scalia's dissent in Sweet Home as an 
illustration and expression of his philosophy of statutory interpreta-
tion and his application of the Chevron rule. Section II of the article 
discusses the genesis and development of the Chevron doctrine. It 
explores the differences between Justice Scalia and his colleagues on 
the Supreme Court with respect to the application of the Chevron 
doctrine. Justice Scalia's formalistic approach to Chevron is contrasted 
with the more flexible manner in which Chevron is applied by Justice 
Stevens and others. 
Section III of the article describes Justice Scalia's judicial philoso-
phy and method of statutory interpretation, as manifested through 
his exegesis of Chevron. This analysis identifies the hierarchy of fac-
tors that were critical for Justice Scalia in resolving the issues pre-
sented by Sweet Home, and helps to explain his dissenting opinion. 
The factors reviewed are the importance for Justice Scalia of the 
ordinary meaning of statutory provisions; the significance of context, 
as provided by the statute as a whole and the body of law in which it 
fits, and the role of history and tradition as guides to proper statutory 
interpretation. 
As the section indicates, all of these elements are critical to what 
Justice Scalia regards as one of a judge's most important tasks, the 
distillation of a general rule for use in future cases. Rules, in turn, are 
essential to the proper functioning of government. They keep order 
among the branches of government and constrain the courts from 
involving themselves improperly in the activities of the other branches. 
Section IV of the article briefly reviews the Endangered Species 
Act and the background of the FWS regulation at issue in Sweet 
Home, before discussing the Supreme Court's opinion and Justice 
Scalia's dissent to it. The dissent is shown to have been entirely 
predictable and the inevitable outcome of Justice Scalia's application 
22 [d. at 2422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
23 [d. at 2426--27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
24 [d. at 2431 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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of the Chevron doctrine and his method of statutory interpretation. 
According to Justice Scalia, the FWS regulation was entitled to no 
deference, regardless of the fact that it was more than twenty-five 
years old when it was challenged, and regardless of the ESA's goal of 
protecting species and the ecosystems on which they depend. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 
Throughout the Sweet Home litigation, both majority and dissent-
ing opinions relied on Chevron to provide the guiding principle for 
decision. In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that a court must defer 
to an agency's permissible interpretation of ambiguous language in a 
statute that the agency administers.25 The court may not substitute 
its judgment for the agency's policy choices.26 
The dispute in Chevron centered on the Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) regulatory definition of the term "stationary source" 
of air pollution as used in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.27 
The amendments established a permit process for new or modified 
major stationary sources of air pollution within "nonattainment" states, 
i.e., those states that had not achieved the national air quality stand-
ards required by earlier versions of the Clean Air Act.28 
Prior to 1977, EPA had allowed states to adopt a plantwide defini-
tion of stationary source. Under the plantwide definition all pollution 
emitting devices within the same facility or group of facilities could 
be treated "as though they were encased within a single bubble."29 
The operator of the facility or facilities could install or modify a piece 
of equipment without meeting permit requirements or obtaining a 
new permit as long as the change did not increase the total emissions 
from the plant.30 
In 1980, EPA adopted regulations that abandoned the bubble con-
cept and applied the permitting requirements to all modifications and 
installations of pollution emitting devices.31 A year later, EPA re-
25 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
26 Id. at 866. 
2742 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994). A stationary source is any building, structure, facility or 
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation under the Clean Air 
Act.Id. 
28 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839--40. 
29 Id. at 840. 
30Id. 
3! Id. at 857; Statutory Restrictions on New Stationary Sources, 40 C.F.R. § 52.24 (1996). 
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evaluated this regulation and reverted to its earlier plantwide defini-
tion.32 
The National Resources Defense Council successfully challenged 
the Agency's action in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit.33 The court of appeals set aside the 
bubble concept as contrary to the purposes of the Clean Air Act's 
nonattainment program.34 The court found the plantwide definition 
"inappropriate" for a program designed to improve, rather than sim-
ply maintain, the current level of air quality.35 In reaching its decision, 
the court of appeals observed that the amended Clean Air Act "does 
not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a 'stationary source' 
to which the permit process ... should apply," and further, that the 
precise issue was not "squarely addressed in the legislative history."36 
For these reasons, the court of appeals determined that "the purposes 
of the nonattainment program should guide our decision here."37 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Although it agreed with 
the D.C. Circuit that Congress did not express its intent concerning 
the application of the bubble concept, it found that the court of appeals 
had "misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulation 
at issue."38 Once the court had determined that the statutory language 
was ambiguous, its job was not to decide whether the bubble concept 
was the appropriate policy choice for a program designed to improve 
air quality, but to evaluate whether EPA's choice was a "permissible" 
one for the Agency to make.39 
The Supreme Court announced a two-step analysis for court review 
of agency interpretations of statutory provisions. First, and "always," 
a court is to determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the 
precise question at issue."40 The inquiry should focus principally on 
the plain language of the statute, but may consider the legislative 
history as well. If the intent of Congress is "clear," "that is the end of 
32 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858; Requirements for Preparation, Adaptation and Submittal of 
Implementation Plans, 40 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1996); Approval and Promulgation of Implementation 
Plans, 40 C.F.R. pt. 52 (1996). 
33 NRDC v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd Bub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
34 [d. at 720. 
36 [d. at 726. 
36 [d. at 723. 
37 [d. at 726 n.39. 
38 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845. 
39 [d. 
40 [d. at 842. 
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the matter, for the court, as well as the agency must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."41 
If, however, the court finds that the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue in question, the second step of the 
analysis is to evaluate whether the agency's answer is based upon a 
"permissible" construction of the statute.42 Deference must be ac-
corded such a construction.43 A permissible construction means a rea-
sonable one, not necessarily the one preferred by the reviewing court. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court emphasized that a reviewing court may 
not substitute its policy judgment for that of the agency, but must 
uphold any reasonable interpretation the agency offers.44 
Chevron has been called a "watershed,decision" in administrative 
law.45 It clarified Supreme Court precedent regarding the duty of the 
lower courts to defer to agencies' reasonable construction of the stat-
utes committed to their administration. It also resolved a significant 
ambiguity in the law resulting from the existence of two conflicting 
lines of decisions, one calling for deference and the other disregarding 
deference altogether.46 
The benefits ascribed to the Chevron doctrine are many, and include 
providing the courts with "a consistent rationale" for deference to 
agency interpretation, without concern for factors such as whether 
the agency's interpretation was consistent over time.47 Judges and 
scholars have also praised Chevron for recognizing agency expertise 
and competence, and for furthering "the democratic values of govern-
mental responsiveness and accountability."48 
41 Id. at 842-43. 
42 Id. at 843. 
43 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
44 Id. at 866. 
45 Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 1986 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 
283 (1986). 
46 Id. at 292-93; Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra 
note 8, at 513. 
47 Starr, supra note 45, at 293-94. Judge Starr regards as a very positive outcome of Chevron 
the Court's conclusion that an agency's interpretation is not carved in stone, and can be 
reevaluated on a continuing basis. Id. at 297 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863). As explained 
by Judge Starr, prior to Chevron the age of a regulation was a frequently cited factor in court 
deference to agency interpretation. Long-standing and consistent interpretations were more 
frequently upheld than new or changed ones. This factor was relevant in Sweet Home; the FWS 
regulation was more than 25 years old when it was challenged. 
43 Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of 
Chevrons Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256 (1988). 
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III. JUSTICE SCALIA AND CHEVRON 
Justice Scalia was not on the Supreme Court when Chevron was 
decided, but is enthusiastic in his support of the opinion, calling it 
"perhaps the most important in the field of administrative law since 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC."49 His characterization 
of the Chevron rule, that "the courts will accept an agency's reason-
able interpretation of the ambiguous terms of a statute that the 
agency administers" appears to match the rule as described in the 
opinion.50 Yet Justice Scalia often disagrees with his colleagues on the 
Court in his interpretation and application of Chevron, as he did in 
the Sweet Home case.51 Similarly, Justice Scalia has taken issue with 
many of the justifications given for the Chevron doctrine by other 
judges and legal scholars. 
It is not immediately apparent to Justice Scalia why a court should 
ever accept the judgment of an executive agency on a question of law. 
"[T]he suggestion seems quite incompatible with Marshall's aphorism 
that'[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is."'52 
49 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 512; 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). In Vermont Yankee, the 
United States Supreme Court held that the courts may not impose upon administrative agencies 
decisionmaking procedures not required by statute or by the agencies' own regulations. See 435 
U.S. at 558. 
50 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 511. 
In Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, explained the Chevron rule as follows: 
If, upon examination of the "particular statutory language at issue, as well as the 
language and design of the statute as a whole," it is clear that the [agency's] interpre-
tation is incorrect, then we need look no further, "for the court, as well as the agency, 
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 
If, on the other hand, "the statute is silent or ambiguous" on the point at issue, we 
must decide "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute." 
495 U.S. 641, 645 (1990) (citations omitted). 
On its face this characterization tracks the Supreme Court's Chevron method of analysis. 
However, major differences have developed between Justice Scalia and his colleagues in the 
mode and outcome of that analysis. See infra Sections IILB.-B.1. 
51 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., MCI Telecommunica-
tions Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel., 512 U.S. 218, 235 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); K Mart 
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 318 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting); INS v. 
Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); infra Sections IILB.-B.1. 
52 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 513 
(quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803». 
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Justice Scalia regards law as an "immutable product of Congress 
... that cannot be altered or affected by what the Executive thinks 
about it."53 Thus, although an agency's expertise, familiarity with the 
history and purpose of a statute and practical knowledge about how 
best to effectuate its purposes may be good practical reasons to accept 
its interpretation of statutory provisions, they are "hardly a valid 
theoretical justification for doing SO."54 
Justice Scalia disagrees as well with those who argue that the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers requires Chevron,55 
although he admits that "there is no one more fond of our system of 
separation of powers than 1."56 He describes the separation of powers 
rationale for Chevron as based on the incorrect premise that, if Con-
gress is silent on a particular matter or leaves an ambiguity in a 
statute that cannot be resolved by "the traditional tools of statutory 
construction," the gap or ambiguity must be resolved by a policy 
judgment.57 The premise assumes that under our system of govern-
ment, policy judgments should be made by the political branches, not 
the judiciary.58 Support for this proposition is found in Chevron. The 
Supreme Court emphasized that it is for the agency, not the reviewing 
court, to make policy choices "resolving the competing interests which 
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally 
left to be resolved."59 
Justice Scalia's rejection of the separation of powers rationale for 
Chevron is puzzling at first. He seems to contradict himself on the 
issue of the policy role of the courts. He once retorted, "I don't deal 
with policy, that's not my business. I gave it up when I took the veil."60 
63 Id. at 513. 
54 Id. at 514. 
65 In Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 515, 
Justice Scalia disagrees with Judge Starr, supra note 45, at 308, 312, and Douglas Kmiec, 
Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 
ADMIN. L. J. 269, 277-78, 283, 285 (1988). Both argue that the separation of powers doctrine 
requires the Chevron rule. 
66 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 515. 
For a discussion of the significance of the separation of powers for Justice Scalia see Scalia, The 
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, supra note 8; Karin 
P. Sheldon, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The Supreme Court's Slash and Burn Approach to 
Environmental Standing, 23 ELR 10031, 10038-42; Karin P. Sheldon, NWF v. Lujan: Justice 
Scalia Restricts Environmental Standing, 20 ELR 10557, 10563 (1990). 
67 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 515. 
63 Id. 
69 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
60 George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1302 
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Justice Scalia has written at length about the limited role of the courts 
in dealing with "majoritarian" policy issues that are the province of 
the other branches of government.61 He is zealous in his support of 
the hands-off approach of Vermont Yankee, believing that courts have 
no business establishing policy-based procedures for administrative 
agencies.62 Yet, in explaining his view of the Chevron doctrine, Justice 
Scalia claims that policy evaluation is one of the "traditional tools of 
statutory construction," which, along with text and legislative history, 
helps a court determine whether a statute is, indeed, ambiguous.63 
What Justice Scalia means by policy considerations, in the context 
of Chevron, are not the political, social, environmental, or economic 
values reflected or expressed in a statute or an agency's interpreta-
tion of it. Rather, he uses policy considerations to mean the evaluation 
of the logical consequences of a particular statutory construction to 
determine whether it would produce "absurd" results or results that 
are incompatible with the purposes of the statute.64 A reviewing court 
must evaluate an agency's basic policy choice in order to ascertain 
whether the agency acted within the scope of its legal authority. This 
evaluation is part of "saying what the law is," because only policy 
choices that logically express the statutory intent must be respected.65 
A. Chevron Provides a Rule for Statutory Interpretation 
For Justice Scalia, "the theoretical justification for Chevron" is that 
it provides an "across-the-board presumption" for interpreting ambi-
guity in a statute.66 Before Chevron, such ambiguity could be ex-
plained in one of two ways: 
n.12 (1990) (quoting Scalia at BC: Conservative Justice Draws Fire After Speech, THE 
KINGSMAN (Brooklyn College student newspaper), Oct. 23, 1989, at 1). 
61 See, e.g., Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, supra note 8; Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
supra note 8. 
62 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 512. 
63 Id. at 515. 
64 Id. 
66 See Kmiec, supra note 55, at 277-78, for a discussion of the role of the courts in considering 
policy issues. Professor Kmiec disputes, as does Justice Scalia, the Chevron Court's statement 
that when a challenge to an agency's construction of a statute centers on the wisdom of the 
agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, 
a court has a duty to respect the policy choices made by the agency. He agrees with Justice 
Scalia that, in such a case, "the legitimacy of the policy choice [is] the very question at issue." 
Id. at 277. Deference is accorded only when a court finds the agency's interpretation "permis-
sible" under the law. Id. at 277-78. 
66 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 516. 
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Congress intended a particular result but was not clear about it, 
or Congress had no particular intent, but meant to leave the 
resolution to the agency. The former raises a question of law, to 
be resolved by the courts. The latter represents a conferral of 
discretion on the agency and the only question for the courts is 
whether the agency acted within the scope of the discretion.67 
497 
Chevron replaced the case-by-case evaluation of congressional intent 
with the presumption that Congress meant to confer upon the agency 
the discretion to construe ambiguous statutory language or to fill gaps 
in the statutory scheme. 
Justice Scalia approves of the Chevron doctrine because the pre-
sumption amounts to a general rule for interpreting silence or ambi-
guity in a statute. Absolute deference to agencies is required when 
congressional intent is not clear, and no deference is given when it is. 
This rule does away with the need for a court to try to ascertain what 
Congress meant when its intent is not clear, a quest that "is probably 
a wild goose chase anywaY,"68 and notifies Congress that any ambigu-
ity it creates will be resolved by administrative agencies whose policy 
biases are known.69 
Justice Scalia warns that there are consequences to a rule that 
statutory ambiguity indicates that Congress intended to confer dis-
cretion on the agency. There is no longer any justification for defer-
ence to long-standing and consistent agency interpretation of a statute.70 
That venerable principle made a lot of sense when we assumed 
that both court and agency were searching for the one, permanent 
"correct" meaning of the statute; it makes no sense when we 
acknowledge that the agency is free to give the statute whichever 
of several possible meanings it thinks most conducive to accom-
plishment of the statutory purpose.71 
Justice Scalia sees as a major advantage of Chevron the flexibility 
it gives to agencies when statutory language is ambiguous to respond 
to new information and changing times.72 In Chevron, the Supreme 
67Id. 
68 Id. at 517. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. Justice Scalia takes the position that the existence of a long-standing interpretation, 
especially one dating from the enactment of the statute, may be relevant under the first part 
of the Chevron analysis to show that the intent of Congress is clear. However, the converse is 
not the case. See id. at 518. A long-standing interpretation cannot be used to dispute unambi-
guous statutory language. See id. at 517. 
71 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 517. 
72 See id. 
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Court noted that the "basic legal error" of the court of appeals was 
"to adopt a static judicial definition of the term 'stationary source' 
when it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded that 
definition."73 Under the Chevron rule, according to Justice Scalia, a 
"stationary source" can mean a number of things, and it is up to the 
Agency to specify the correct meaning. As long as an agency's choice 
is reasonable, a court must defer, regardless of whether the court 
would have preferred a different outcome.74 
1. Plain Meaning as a Source of Rules 
Justice Scalia has great faith in rules. He has written that his 
regard for the clearly enunciated rule marks his maturity as a lawyer 
and jurist.75 Justice Scalia believes that "the establishment of broadly 
applicable general principles is an essential component of the judicial 
process .... "76 Rules promote uniformity, predictability, and consis-
tency in judicial treatment of issues, matters essential to the human 
sense of justice, and to the protection of individual rights.77 He has 
said, "Our highest responsibility in the field of statutory construction 
is to read the laws in a consistent way, giving Congress a sure means 
by which it may work the people's will."78 
Where do rules come from ? Justice Scalia's ready answer is the 
language of the statute at issue. For him, text is "the starting point 
and the beginning of wisdom."79 "[J]udges cannot create [rules] out of 
73 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984). 
74 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 518. 
75 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 8, at 1178. 
Id. 
When I was in law school, I was a great enthusiast of [the discretion-conferring] 
approach-an advocate of both writing and reading the "holding" of a decision nar-
rowly, thereby leaving greater discretion to future courts. Over the years ... I have 
found myself drawn more and more to the opposite view .... [It is] much better, even 
at the expense of the mild substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, 
to have a clear, previously enunciated rule one can point to in explanation of the 
decision. 
76 Id. at 1185; see also Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and The Rule of 
Law, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 1041 (1994). Professor Segall observes that for Justice Scalia, 
"the essence of the judicial craft is not to dispense justice or even to derive the most accurate 
interpretation of the legal text, but to provide precise and principled content to the legal 
directive at issue in a case." Segall, supra, at 1041. 
77 Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 581, 588 (1989-90). 
78 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
79 Kannar, supra note 60, at 1307 (quoting Hearings on the Nomination of Judge Antonin 
Scalia before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1986». 
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whole cloth, but must find some basis for them in the text that Con-
gress or the Constitution has provided."80 This is done by examining 
the text to determine its plain meaning, the meaning "most in ac-
cord with context and ordinary usage . . . and most compatible with 
the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be inte-
grated .... "81 
Professor George Kannar, in his illuminating article The Constitu-
tional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, observes that the ordinary meaning 
of statutory text assumes for Justice Scalia an enhanced role in adju-
dication, partially replacing statutory purpose, and completely elimi-
nating any unconstrained examination of evolving social values.82 He 
comments further that, for Justice Scalia: 
[d]ecisions are to be arrived at in new cases by looking at the 
challenged law or practice, and by measuring it against the text, 
including, if necessary, the "glosses" on that text rendered in 
earlier authoritative readings. All this is to be done in as seman-
tically precise a way as possible, so as to minimize one's own 
interpretive discretion and the influence of social, political, or 
moral context, except as that context has made its way directly 
into the "ordinary meaning" of relevant, legally operative words.83 
An example of Justice Scalia's use of "semantically precise" textual 
analysis to ascertain the ordinary meaning of statutory language is 
his opinion for the majority in MCl Telecommunications Corp. v. 
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (hereinafter MCl).84 The case 
centered on the meaning of the phrase "modify any requirement" in 
§ 203(b) of the Federal Communications Act (FCA) of 1934.85 Petition-
ers argued that the authority given to the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to "modify" the regulatory scheme established by 
the Act included the authority to make fundamental changes in it.86 
They supported this position with several dictionary definitions of 
80 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 8, at 1183. 
81 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
82 Kannar, supra note 60, at 1307. 
&'! ld. at 1308. 
84 512 U.S. 218, 231-34 (1994). The United States Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Communications Commission's (FCC) discretion to modify the regulatory scheme established 
by the Federal Communications Act does not permit the FCC to make basic and fundamental 
changes in the scheme. The change at issue in the case, an exemption from tariff filing require-
ments for nondominant long distance telephone carriers, exceeded the Agency's authority. ld. 
85 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1994). 
86 MCI, 512 U.S. at 225-26. 
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"modify," all taken from Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary. One of these definitions was "to make a basic or important change 
in."87 Petitioners claimed that the variety of meanings given to "mod-
ify" created a sufficient ambiguity about what Congress intended in 
the Act to entitle the FCC to deference in its interpretation.88 
Justice Scalia disagreed, with considerable relish, on the basis of 
the ordinary meaning of the language and its context in the statute. 
He devoted three pages of the opinion to a discussion of the use of 
dictionary definitions and the differences between the true meaning 
of a word and "what is nowadays called 'spin."'89 Justice Scalia said 
that he had "not the slightest doubt" about the meaning of "modify" 
intended by Congress in the FCA.90 "Modify ... connotes moder-
ate change," he said, no more.91 Justice Scalia dismissed the defini-
tion given in Webster's Third International Dictionary as based on 
"intentional distortions, or simply careless or ignorant misuse" of the 
word.92 
Petitioners in Mel also argued that their interpretation furthered 
the Act's broad purpose of promoting efficient telephone service and 
competition in the industry.93 Justice Scalia replied, "[O]ur estima-
tions, and the Commission's estimations, of desirable policy cannot 
alter the meaning of the Federal Communications Act of 1934."94 The 
Court's job was not to consider the relationship between the agency's 
regulations and the overall purposes of the Act; it was to find the 
ordinary meaning of the words used in the statutory section at issue. 
"For better or worse," Justice Scalia announced, the statute meant 
what it said.95 
The relationship between statutory purpose and plain meaning 
appeared as an issue in Sweet Home.96 Justice Scalia rejected the 
87 ld. at 226. 
88 ld. 
89 I d. at 226--28. 
90 ld. at 228. 
91 MCl, 512 U.S. at 228. 
92 ld. AB noted by Bradley C. Karkkainen in "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence 
of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 401, 442-50 (1994), Justice Scalia 
is particularly nimble in working his way out of statutory ambiguity. He uses external aids such 
as a thesaurus and a dictionary to support his conclusions, as well as grammatical and structural 
inferences. While this may seem inconsistent with his strict textualist approach, Justice Scalia 
regards it as part of a plain meaning analysis. 
93 MCl, 512 U.S. at 233. 
94 ld. at 234. 
95 ld. 
96 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2413 (1995). 
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majority's reference to the broad goals of the ESA as support for the 
FWS's interpretation of harm.97 The idea that damage to privately 
owned habitat harms endangered species may well be correct, but for 
Justice Scalia, it is not the idea that Congress enacted.98 
Justice Scalia's opinion in Mel illustrates the difference between 
the policy considerations that he regards as part of a judge's statutory 
interpretation toolbox and policy decisions that belong to the legisla-
tive or executive branches of government.99 It is not for the courts to 
impose policy choices upon individuals or agencies. Rather, the courts 
are limited to finding the intent of the legislature in the meaning of 
the language and its logical outcome when implemented. 
Sweet Home is another example of the Court making the same 
mistake. Justice Scalia believes the majority confused its appropriate 
policy role and approved an interpretation of the ESA that leads to 
absurd results and makes nonsense of the language it was intended 
to interpret.loo 
2. Context and Tradition Support Plain Meaning 
As noted above, for Justice Scalia, the plain meaning of a statute is 
also the one that is most in accord with the context of the statute as 
a whole and the body of law, both statutory and judge-made, into 
which the statute fits.lOl In Sweet Home, for example, Justice Scalia 
looked at the structure of the ESA and claimed that the meaning of 
the term "take" advanced by the FWS could not be used consistently 
throughout the statute.102 He also argued that the idea of "take" as 
limited to hunting, capturing, or killing animals is "deeply embedded 
in the statutory and common law concerning wildlife."103 
A second contextual source of statutory meaning is what Justice 
Scalia refers to as "our society's traditional understanding of [the] 
97 See id. at 2426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
98 See id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
99 See Mel, 512 U.S. at 234. 
100 See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2423-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
101 See United States Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see 
also Karkkainen, supra note 92, at 407-08. The author identifies four different contexts that 
Justice Scalia appears to consider when interpreting the meaning of statutory language: the 
linguistic and cultural context of the language used; the textual context, i.e., how the words are 
used within the statute; the legal context provided by the surrounding body of law, and the 
traditional context, i.e., the meaning understood by the society in which the statute was enacted. 
102 See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2425 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
103 See id. at 2422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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text."I04 Justice Scalia believes that the courts should respect long-
standing interpretations or practices which illuminate the intent of 
legislatures in the use of particular language.lo5 Traditions, like rules, 
provide predictability and consistency in decisionmaking. Again, in 
Sweet Home, Justice Scalia looked back to the historic meaning of 
"take," a term he noted is "as old as the law itself," and concluded that 
the FWS's definition was contrary to the customary and expected 
understanding of the term.106 
3. Statutory Language, Not Legislative History, Supports 
Plain Meaning 
For "textualists"107 like Justice Scalia, statutory interpretation is 
objective, not subjective. A court's job is to ask what the ordinary 
reader of a statute would have understood the words to mean at the 
time of enactment, not what the intentions of the enacting legislators 
were. Thus, he is emphatic that the meaning of a statute is to be 
derived from its text, context, and structure, not from some "unleg-
islated intent" revealed by legislative history.lOB Justice Scalia frowns 
on the widespread use of legislative history by judges to help decide 
104 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Casey involved a challenge to the constitutionality of amendments to Pennsylvania's 
abortion statute. See id. at 844. The United States Supreme Court held that the amendments 
were an undue state interference with a woman's right to have an abortion. See id. at 846. The 
Court ruled that the substantive liberties protected by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution 
are not limited to those rights expressly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. See id. at 847-49. 
Justice Scalia objected to the Court's conclusion that the Constitution has "an evolving meaning" 
that supports decisions articulating constitutionally protected rights that are not actually stated 
within the Constitution itself. See id. at 1000 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). He argued 
for an interpretation based on society's "traditional understanding" of individual rights, which 
does not extend, in his view, to the value judgments made by the majority. Id. at 1000-01. 
105 Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black 
and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 51 (1994). 
106 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
107 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623-24 (1990). 
Professor Eskridge applies the term "textualism" to the method of interpreting statutes based 
on the ordinary understanding of the words used and their context in the structure of the 
statute.Id. 
108 Antonin Scalia, Use of Legislative History, Address Delivered between Fall 1985 and 
Spring 1986 at Various Law Schools and in Various Forms, quoted in Daniel A. Farber & Philip 
P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 455 (1988). Justice Scalia said: 
If I were writing on a blank slate, I suppose I would call into question the fundamental 
premise upon which all use of legislative history is based-the generally accepted 
proposition ... that "interpretive doubts ... are to be resolved by judicial resort to an 
intention entertained by the law-making body at the time of its enactment." 
Id. at 454. 
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congressional intent, and accuses such judges of "employ[ing] a tink-
erer's toolbox" or trying to "psychoanalyze" Congress, rather than 
read its laws.109 Legislative history should be avoided for three rea-
sons: it allows courts to reach the wrong result with respect to the 
statute before them; it "poison[s] the well offuture legislation, depriv-
ing legislators of the assurance that ordinary terms, used in an ordi-
nary context, will be given a predictable meaning;"IlO and it permits 
"agency -liberating ambiguity". 111 
The only appropriate function of legislative history is to verify the 
intent determined by textual analysis of the statute. In Sweet Home 
Justice Scalia used selected legislative history for this purpose, to 
affirm the "ordinary" meaning of "take" and "harm" in the ESA, and 
to demonstrate the majority's error in relying on other portions of 
the legislative history.1l2 Justice Scalia steadfastly maintains that he 
would not allow legislative history to lead him to a result different 
from that provided by textual analysis. ll3 
For Justice Scalia, deferring to an agency's interpretation of a 
statute is an infrequent occurrence. He suggests that those who favor 
Chevron, as he does, are those who generally find the plain meaning 
of a statute apparent from its text, and thus do not need to consider 
the agency's construction.l14 "It is rare," Justice Scalia says, "that even 
the most vague and general text cannot be given some precise, prin-
cipled content-and that is indeed the essence of the judicial craft."u5 
4. Absolute Deference Is Required When a Statute Is Unclear 
The question for statutory interpretation under the Chevron rule, 
as Justice Scalia poses it, is: "how clear is clear?" Chevron "suggests 
that the opposite of 'ambiguity' is not 'resolvability' but rather 'clar-
ity."'u6 A statute is ambiguous when the language admits of two or 
more reasonable interpretations, and is, therefore, "unclear." Only 
109 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
11°Id. 
111 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 521. 
112 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 
2426-27 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
113 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
114 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 521. 
115 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 8, at 1183. 
116 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 520 
(footnotes omitted). 
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then should a court turn to the agency to see whether its construction 
of the ambiguous language is permissible. ll7 
As Justice Scalia applies Chevron, when a reviewing court finds 
that legislative intent is "clear," it may not consider the agency's 
interpretation. No deference may be given, regardless of whether the 
interpretation is supportive of the overall goals and purposes of the 
statute. In Sweet Home, for example, Justice Scalia found the major-
ity's emphasis on the purposes of the ESA improper under the Chev-
ron analysis because the statutory language was clear.u8 
If, on the other hand, a court finds the intent of Congress to be 
ambiguous, deference to an agency's permissible construction is abso-
lute.u9 A court may not substitute its own interpretation of the statu-
tory provision at issue, regardless of its opinion of the policy outcome. 
In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,120 for example, Justice Scalia objected 
to the Supreme Court's adoption of an interpretation that had not 
been advanced by the agency and was "contrary to ordinary usage, 
to the purposes of the statute, and to the interpretation the agency 
appears to have applied consistently for half a century."121 He particu-
larly was displeased with Justice Brennan's claim that the Court could 
decline to apply statutory language to a situation that it clearly cov-
ered on the grounds that, had Congress "foreseen modern circum-
stances," it would have provided an exception.l22 He said: 
The principle of our democratic system is not that each legislature 
enacts a purpose, independent of the language of the statute, 
which the courts must then perpetuate, assuring that it is fully 
achieved but never overshot by expanding or ignoring the statu-
tory language as changing circumstances require.123 
117 See id. at 520-2l. 
118 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2426 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
119 See NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133--34 (1987) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing support for the Court's deference to the Agency's interpre-
tation). 
12il 486 U.S. 281, 318 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). 
121 [d. at 323 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). 
122 See id. at 324 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Brennan saw the purpose of 
the statute at issue as protecting U.S. trademark owners from gray-market competition. In 
light of that purpose, he found ambiguous the statutory language prohibiting importation cif 
goods "of foreign manufacture" bearing a trademark "owned by" a citizen of or "corporation ... 
organized within the United States," and chose to defer to the regulation of the Customs 
Service. See id. at 328-29 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). 
123 [d. at 325 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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B. Conflicts With Supreme Court Colleagues Over 
Chevron Methodology 
505 
It is in his formalistic application of Chevron that Justice Scalia is 
most at odds with his Supreme Court colleagues. In MCI, for example, 
Justice Scalia ruled that an agency's interpretation of a statute is not 
entitled to deference when it goes beyond the meaning the language 
of the provision at issue can bear.124 The changes proposed by the FCC 
"may be a good idea," he said, "but [they are] not the idea Congress 
enacted into law in 1934."125 Justice Stevens, in his dissent, accused 
Justice Scalia of abandoning the tradition of according an agency 
substantial leeway to interpret and apply its statutory powers and 
responsibilities "in favor of a rigid literalism that deprives [the agency] 
of the flexibility Congress meant it to have in order to implement the 
core policies of [an act] in rapidly changing conditions."126 
The debate on this issue is quite heated. INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca 
illustrates both Justice Scalia's aversion to the use of legislative his-
tory to discern congressional intent and his obdurate approach to the 
deference aspect of the Chevron analysis. Justice Scalia charged Jus-
tice Stevens, the primary author of the Chevron opinion, with ex-
pressing "controversial, and I believe erroneous, views on the mean-
ing of this Court's decision in Chevron."127 
The issue in Cardozo-Fonseca was the meaning of two sections of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act dealing with the deportation of 
aliens.128 The first, § 243(h),129 requires the Attorney General not to 
deport an alien who demonstrates that his or her "life or freedom 
would be threatened" by deportation. In INS v. Stevie, the United 
States Supreme Court held that this standard requires an alien to 
show that "it is more likely than not" that he or she would be subject 
to persecution in the country to which he or she was deported.130 
124 Mel, 512 u.s. 218, 229 (1994). 
1251d. at 231-32. 
1261d. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 
116,151-53 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for ignoring the regulatory 
history and failing to defer to the Agency's interpretation). Justice Scalia, concurring in Maislin, 
argues that the Agency's policy conflicts with the text of the statute and deserves no deference. 
ld. at 137 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
127 INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
128 ld. at 423; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a), 1253(h) (1994). 
129 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). 
130 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984). 
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The second section, § 208(a),131 authorizes the Attorney General, in 
his or her discretion, to grant asylum to an alien "refugee" unable or 
unwilling to return to his or her home country because of "a well 
founded fear" of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,I32 
Cardozo-Fonseca was a Nicaraguan citizen who requested that she 
not be deported pursuant to § 243(h) and also that she be granted 
asylum pursuant to § 208(a),133 To support her request under § 243(h), 
she attempted to show that if she were forced to return to Nicaragua, 
it was "more likely than not" that her life or freedom would be 
threatened because of her political views,l34 To support her request 
for asylum under § 208 she attempted to show that she had "a well 
founded fear of persecution" upon her return home,I35 
The Immigration Judge applied the "more likely than not" standard 
to both requests,I36 The judge ruled that Cardozo-Fonseca had not 
established "a clear probability of persecution" and, therefore, was 
not entitled to either form of relief,I37 The judge's decision was affir-
med by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA),I38 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
ruling that the "well founded fear" standard governs asylum proceed-
ings, while the "clear probability" standard applies to deportation 
proceedings,I39 The court based its conclusion on the text and struc-
ture of the Act,I40 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, hold-
ing that the "ordinary and obvious meaning" of the statutory lan-
guage, as well as the structure of the Act, indicated Congress's intent 
to provide two procedures for dealing with deportable aliens, each 
with its own standard of proof,I41 The Court held that the question of 
whether Congress had intended the two standards in the Act to be 
131 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). This Section was added to the Immigration and Naturalization Act by 
the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 105 (1980). 
132 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining a refugee as a person who cannot return home because of 
a well founded fear of reprisal). 
133 See INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 424 (1987). 
134 Id. at 425. 
135 Id. at 424. 
136 I d. at 425. 
137 Id. 
138 Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 425. 
139 See Cardozo-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1985), a/I'd, 480 U.S. 421 
(1987). 
140 Id. 
141 See Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431-32. 
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identical was "a pure question of statutory construction for the courts 
to decide," using "traditional tools of statutory construction."l42 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens then "confirmed" the plain 
meaning of the statutory language with a lengthy discussion of the 
legislative history of the Act, prior immigration policy and practice, 
and the applicable United Nations protocol on the subject.l43 Justice 
Stevens also concluded that courts must defer to the INS's interpre-
tation of the standards as the Agency applied them in particular 
circumstances:l44 
There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like "well-founded 
fear" which can only be given concrete meaning through a process 
of case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling '''any gap 
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,'" the courts must respect 
the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated 
the responsibility for administering the statutory program.145 
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment of the Court that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act calls for two separate standards for 
treating deportable aliens.146 He did not join in the Court's opinion, 
however, because of what he called the majority's "ill-advised devia-
tion" from Chevron.147 When the language of the statute is clear, there 
is no need for any discussion of legislative history, much less the 
"excessive" review provided by the majority.l48 
Justice Scalia was even more troubled by the Court's "gratuitous" 
consideration of whether INS's construction of the statute was enti-
tled to deference.149 In the absence of statutory ambiguity, he said, 
"there is simply no need and thus no justification for a discussion of 
whether the interpretation is entitled to deference."l50 He found the 
majority's "superfluous discussion" to be ''flatly inconsistent with [the] 
well-established interpretation of Chevron."151 To Justice Scalia, the 
majority's discussion implied that courts may substitute their own 
translation of a statute for that of an agency whenever, using the 
traditional tools of statutory construction, they are able to reach a 
142 [d. at 446. 
143 See id. at 432-43. 
144 [d. at 448. 
145 [d. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984». 
146 Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
147 [d. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
148 [d. at 453 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
149 [d. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
150 [d. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
151 Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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conclusion as to the proper explanation of the statute.l52 He warned that 
this approach makes deference "a doctrine of desperation," authoriz-
ing the courts to defer only when they are unable to construe the 
statute before them.153 
The strength of Justice Scalia's conviction that the majority was 
terribly wrong in its understanding and application of Chevron in 
Cardozo-Fonseca was expressed further in letters to Justice Stevens.l54 
Justice Scalia wrote, "I continue to believe that your discussion of 
Chevron deprives that case of all utility"155 and "is utterly destructive 
of Chevron as a significant guide to decisions."156 Justice Stevens 
responded: 
I believe your criticism ... is based on a misreading of the Court's 
opinion in Chevron. That opinion did not announce a simple black 
letter rule requiring absolute deference to agencies unless there 
is clear evidence of congressional intent, and no deference when 
the intent is clear .... The more important inquiry is whether the 
issue is one that Congress intended itself to resolve or whether it 
is in an interstitial area in which Congress intended to delegate 
lawmaking authority to the agency.157 
Justice Scalia remained unconvinced. He reiterated his position that 
the purpose of the Chevron rule is to direct the courts to determine 
congressional intent "on the basis of the clarity with which Congress 
has spoken," and nothing more.15S If the statute is ambiguous, "reso-
lution of the ambiguity is presumptively for the agency that Congress 
has put in charge of implementing the law."159 
1. Without Rules, Government is Rudderless 
Although Justice Scalia claims to renounce the separation of powers 
principle as a central rationale for Chevron, his explanation of the 
162 [d. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
153 [d. (Scalia, J., concurring). 
164 Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 46 (1995) (quoting Letters from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice John 
Paul Stevens (Feb. 5, 1987, Feb. 10, 1987». 
150 [d. (quoting Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 (Feb. 10, 
1987». 
156 [d. (quoting Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice John Paul Stevens 1 (Feb. 5, 
1987». 
157 [d. (quoting Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Antonin Scalia (Feb. 9, 1987». 
158 [d. at 48 (quoting Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice John Paul Stevens (Feb. 
10,1987». 
159 Schwartz, supra note 154, at 48. 
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justification for the Chevron doctrine focuses on the appropriate roles 
for the various branches of government. He approves of Chevron 
because it established a general rule for statutory interpretation in 
administrative law cases.160 
Rules are essential to the proper functioning of government. In-
deed, Justice Scalia has said, "a government of laws means a govern-
ment of rules."161 Rules define institutional roles for the three branches 
of government. They direct and control the activities of these branches, 
preserving the checks and balances within our Constitutional sys-
tem.162 Rules advise the legislature of what to expect from the other 
branches. The Chevron rule, for example, notifies Congress that if it 
is not clear in expressing its intent in a statute, administrative agen-
cies will resolve the ambiguity as they see fit, and the courts will defer 
so long as the resolution is reasonable.163 
Rules also constrain judges, and prevent them from intruding im-
properly into the spheres of the political branches. "Only by announc-
ing rules do we hedge ourselves in," says Justice Scalia, noting that 
rules both inhibit courts from legislating and embolden them to stand 
up for the minority against the popular will. l64 This latter benefit 
vindicates what, for Justice Scalia, is the courts' most significant role 
under the Constitution: "to decide the rights of individuals, not to 
inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in 
which they have a discretion."165 
For a member of the judiciary, Justice Scalia has a particularly 
cynical view of his colleagues. He labels judges "elitist" or "classist," 
and accuses them of having a distorted view of reality.166 He regards 
an unrestrained judiciary determined to decide cases as it pleases as 
160 Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, supra note 8, at 516. 
161 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has 
elaborated on this view in The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. See supra note 8, passim. 
162 Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, supra note 8, at 1180. The checks and balances 
to which Justice Scalia refers are not checks and balances as we usually understand them. The 
Justice believes in a government of separated powers. The branches constrain each other only 
as a function of the implementation of their respective enumerated authorities. 
163 See id. at 1183. 
164 Id. at 1180. 
165 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
supra note 8, at 883 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803». 
166 Id. at 896. Justice Scalia has described the judiciary as a group "selected from the aristoc-
racy of the highly educated, instructed to be governed by a body of knowledge that values 
abstract principle above concrete result, and (just in case any connection with the man on the 
street might subsist) removed from all accountability to the electorate." Id. 
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a threat to individual liberty, democratic government, and the sanc-
tity of the Constitution.167 
Nowhere does he find the judiciary's wrong-headed enthusiasm for 
improper interference with "majoritarian" issues more pronounced 
than in its response to environmental cases. In his article The Doc-
trine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Pow-
ers,168 Justice Scalia contrasted the constitutionally proper province 
of the courts, as set forth in Marbury v. Madison, with the role 
depicted by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in the opening paragraphs of its decision in Calvert 
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commission. 169 In Calvert Cliffs, the court ordered the Atomic En-
ergy Commission to comply with the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) of 1969170 and set the stage for a host of lawsuits to 
enforce that statute. Calvert Cliffs is widely regarded as one of the 
most significant and compelling court decisions on environmental mat-
ters ever written. Justice Scalia himself labeled the decision as the 
start of "the judiciary's long love affair with environmental litiga-
tion."171 The D.C. Circuit characterized Calvert Cliffs as "the begin-
ning of what promises to become a flood of new litigation-litigation 
seeking judicial assistance in protecting our natural environment."172 
The court of appeals defined its "duty" in this litigation as to "see that 
important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are 
not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureauc-
racy."173 
For Justice Scalia, it is emphatically not the duty of the courts to 
protect the environment, unless of course, some individual has suf-
fered a particularized, redressable injury relating to it.174 Further-
more, it is a "good thing" if important legislative purposes are lost or 
misdirected in the vast halls of the federal bureaucracy, as long as no 
minority interests are affected.175 Lawsuits concerning majoritarian 
167 Gerhardt, supra note 105, at 28-29. 
168 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
supra note 8, at 883--84. 
169 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
170 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994). 
171 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
supra note 8, at 884. 
172 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1111. 
173 [d. 
174 See Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
supra note 8, at 885-86. 
175 [d. at 897. 
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issues like clean air and water improperly involve the courts in the 
political process, and turn political decisions into legal ones. The Con-
stitution restricts the courts to deciding the rights of individuals 
because the courts have been "specifically designed to be bad" at 
vindicating the rights of the majority, and instead substitute their 
own distorted judgments for those that would be made by the public.176 
Where the courts, in the supposed interest of all the people, do 
enforce upon the executive branch adherence to legislative polices 
that the political process itself would not enforce, judges are likely 
(despite the best of intentions) to be enforcing the political preju-
dices of their own class. Their greatest success in such an enter-
prise-ensuring strict enforcement of the environmental laws, not 
to protect particular minorities but for the benefit of all the peo-
ple-met with approval in the classrooms of Cambridge and New 
Haven, but not in the factories of Detroit and the mines of West 
Virginia.177 
Apart from the temperature of his rhetoric, Justice Scalia's views 
on the principal benefit of Chevron resemble those of Judge Starr 
described above, despite Justice Scalia's explicit rejection of the sepa-
ration of powers as a justification for the Chevron rule. As articu-
lated by Judge Starr, Chevron produced a more correct alignment of 
authority within and among the branches of government.178 The deci-
sion, along with Vermont Yankee, effected a shift from a "supervisory 
paradigm" to a more deferential "check and balance" paradigm.179 
Under the supervisory paradigm, the federal courts often saw their 
role as supervisors of administrative agencies, as if the agencies were 
subordinate in the organizational structure of government. The courts 
provided the agencies with procedural rules and undertook de novo 
interpretation of statutes, even when the agencies had developed 
their own construction.180 
Forjudge Starr, Chevron "strongly suggests that courts should see 
themselves ... more as a check or bulwark against abuses of agency 
power."181 It is not their role to impose procedures on either of the two 
coordinate branches of government or to ensure that executive poli-
cies or congressional decisionmaking are internally consistent.182 As 
176Id. at 896. 
177 Id. at 897. 
178 Starr, supra note 45, at 300-04. 
179 Id. at 300. 
180 Id. at 300, 304-05. 
181Id. at 300-0l. 
182Id. at 301, 303. 
512 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:487 
long as the procedures and policies of the legislative and executive 
branches pass constitutional muster, the courts will not interfere. As 
Judge Starr stated: 
Chevron vindicates the appropriate and traditional function of 
judicial review. It confirms the judiciary's historic role of declaring 
what the law is, but prevents the judiciary from going beyond that 
venerable, legitimate role and straying into the forbidden ground 
of overseeing administrative agencies. When Congress has not 
spoken to an issue, Chevron forbids the courts to engage in super-
visory oversight of the agencies. Ours is not to supervise; that role 
is allotted to the political branches, those directly accountable to 
the people. Chevron affirms that fundamental allocation ofrespon-
sibility.l83 
The concept of the "fundamental allocation of responsibility" among 
the branches of government is critical to Justice Scalia's legal philoso-
phy.l84 Indeed, separation of powers is the "central mechanism" of our 
constitutional government,J85 "more sacred than any other [principle] 
in the Constitution."I86 Unlike Judge Starr, however, for whom the 
model achieved by Chevron is a deferential check and balance para-
digm, for Justice Scalia, the realignment caused by Chevron helps 
confine the branches of government to their constitutionally desig-
nated spheres of power. For Justice Scalia, the cardinal constitutional 
standard defining the roles of governmental institutions is not feder-
alism, but rather "[a] system of separate and coordinate powers."187 
He believes the Framers of the Constitution drew bright lines around 
each branch of government and gave it enumerated and exclusive 
authority.188 The powers of government are not equally distributed 
183 Starr, supra note 45, at 309. 
184 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of Separation of Powers, supra 
note 8, at 894-97; see also Karkkainen, supra note 92, at 425-28. 
185 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
supra note 8, at 881. 
186 Antonin Scalia, Remarks at the Administrative Law Section's 1976 Bicentennial Institute 
on Oversight and Review of Agency Decisionmaking, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 569, 686 (1976). 
187 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Richard A. Brisbin, 
"Administrative Law is not for Sissies" Justice Antonin Scalia's Challenge to American 
Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 107, 109 (1992). 
188 Scalia, supra note 186, at 686. For an example of how this view is expressed in an opinion, 
see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983), which struck down the legislative veto as a violation 
of the separation of powers doctrine. In Chadha, Justice Burger observed that the Constitution 
divides national power "into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial ... " 
and that it guarantees "[a]s nearly as possible, that each Branch of government [will] confine 
itself to its assigned responsibility." Id. 
1997] SCALINS STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 513 
among the branches. Some administrative power is concentrated in 
the executive and can be constrained by the other branches only as 
they exercise their own exclusive powers, or by the electoral and 
political processes.189 
It is not surprising, then, that Justice Scalia does not accept Justice 
Stevens's characterization of Chevron as permitting a court to decide 
whether the issue before it is in "an interstitial area in which Congress 
intended to delegate lawmaking authority to the agency."190 In a sys-
tem of separated powers there are no "interstitial areas." The bright 
lines dividing the branches must not be blurred. Although Justice 
Scalia acknowledges that "a certain degree of discretion ... inheres 
in most executive or judicial action," he emphasizes that "it is up to 
Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory 
commands, to determine . . . how small or large that degree shall 
be."191 He made this argument in his dissent in Mistretta v. United 
States, which upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing 
Commission as an independent body within the judicial branch.192 
He characterized the Commission as "illogical and destructive of the 
structure of the Constitution" and "a new Branch altogether, a sort 
of junior-varsity Congress."193 The Commission's authority to issue 
sentencing guidelines is a lawmaking function, but one that is "com-
pletely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the law or 
adjudication of private rights under the law."194 
For Justice Scalia, it is beyond the constitutional authority of Con-
gress to delegate legislative power. "[T]he power to make law cannot 
be exercised by anyone other than Congress, except in conjunction 
with the lawful exercise of executive or judicial power."195 Courts may 
distill categorical rules from broadly worded statutes, and agencies 
may promulgate binding regulations because the exercise of lawmak-
ing power in these situations is "ancillary" to the proper exercise of 
the court's or agency's own constitutional authority.196 
189 Morrison, 487 u.s. at 708--15. Such a system of separated powers ''necessarily involves an 
acceptance of exclusive power that can theoretically be abused." [d. at 710 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
see also Brisbin, supra note 187, at 109-11. 
190 Schwartz, supra note 154, at 48 (quoting Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice 
Antonin Scalia (Feb. 9, 1987». 
191 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
192 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
193 [d. at 424, 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
194 [d. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
196 [d. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
196 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the contrast 
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As noted above, one of the principal reasons for a strict separation 
of powers is to preserve individual liberties by keeping the power of 
each branch of government limited. Government is controlled most 
effectively by the rule of law, which, as Justice Scalia describes it, 
means a law ofrules.197 Justice Scalia truly believes that if the original 
meaning of a statute is not "fixed" and "immutable," and instead 
expresses evolving social values that a court, or an agency for that 
matter, is free to interpolate, everything falls apart, "we are rudder-
less."l98 He made this point in his forceful dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 
which upheld the Ethics in Government Act, the statute providing for 
an independent special counsel to investigate and prosecute crimi-
nal activity in the executive branch.l99 The majority concluded that 
the statute was constitutional because it gave the executive branch 
"sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the 
President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties."200 
Justice Scalia argued that control was not the issue. The rule set forth 
in the Constitution is that all executive branch authority must reside 
in the executive branch, and it is not for the courts to say otherwise.201 
The Court has ... replaced the clear constitutional prescription 
that the executive power belongs to the President with a ''balanc-
ing test." Once we depart from the text of the Constitution, just 
where ... do we stop? ... Evidently, the governing standard is 
to be what might be called the unfettered wisdom of a majority 
of this Court, revealed to an obedient people on a case-by-case 
basis. This is not only not the government of laws that the Con-
stitution established; it is not a government oflaws at all.202 
2. The Methodology is The Message 
Justice Scalia is committed to his method of statutory interpreta-
tion and his concept of the Chevron rule. He often refuses to join in 
the opinions of his colleagues, despite agreement with the results, if 
he believes they got there the wrong way.203 The importance of method 
between Justice Scalia and his colleagues on separation of powers issues see Mark Nielson, 
Mistretta v. United States and the Separation of Powers, 12 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 1049, 
1059-00 (1989). 
197 Karkkainen, supra note 92, at 427; see also Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 
supra note 8, at 1184. 
19B Karkkainen, supra note 92, at 427. 
199 Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 704 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
200 ld. at 696 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2Olld. at 708-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2021d. at 711-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
203 Dean Edelman, a classmate of Justice Scalia at Harvard, writes that he and the Justice 
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gives the impression that he cares little about the substantive conse-
quences of his decisions on the environment.204 In Sweet Home, for 
example, his decision that damage to the habitat of species protected 
by the Endangered Species Act does not constitute harm to those 
species seems almost ludicrous on it face. A bird whose nesting tree 
has been cut down is obviously harmed, as is a fish whose lake is 
drained or poisoned. 
As we have seen, however, Justice Scalia's opinions are intended to 
do more than express his views in particular cases. They are part of 
his campaign to "maneuver" the law back to the "original under-
standing" of how the Constitution designed the government to func-
tion.205 Professor Thomas Merrill206 has commented that, since his 
appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia "has been conduct-
ing what amounts to a continuous seminar on the virtues of textualism 
and evils of legislative history."207 
The "seminar" has other subjects as well. Professor Brisbin sug-
gests that Justice Scalia is using his decisions on executive power and 
administrative law to reduce the role of the judiciary in policy mat-
ters and to compartmentalize administrative politics in the executive 
branch.208 
were taught judicial restraint, neutral principles and "the Frankfurter school of legal analysis," 
i.e., use of the right method will yield the right answer. Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's 
Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades of Felix Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade 
of the 1950's, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1799 (1991). Dean Edelman notes, however, that Justice 
Scalia does have a "noticeable tendency" to depart from his method when he feels the need to 
do so. See id. See generally Kannar, supra note 60, (describing Justice Scalia's commitment to 
methodology). 
204 Dean Edelman suggests that Justice Scalia's methodology often results in a lack of judicial 
protection for ''the poor, the powerless and the unpopular." Edelman, supra note 203, at 1801; 
see also Toby Golick, Justice Scalia, Poverty and the Good Society, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1817, 
1820 (1991). 
206 Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 
supra note 8, at 899. 
206 Professor Thomas Merrill is the John Paul Stevens Professor of Law at Northwestern 
University School of Law. 
207 Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 
351, 363 (1994). Justice Scalia's persistence is paying off. In the 1988-89 term, Supreme Court 
opinions reflected a greater reliance on text and a more cautious use of legislative history as 
compared to the opinions of the 1981 term. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use 
of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 195 (1983); Patricia 
M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 309 (1990). Professor 
Merrill updated Judge Wald's surveys in 1994 and reported a "major transformation" in the 
Court's use of legislative history. Merrill, supra, at 355-56, 359. 
208 Brisbin, supra note 187, at 128. 
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Various institutions and segments of society are the intended stu-
dents of the Scalia "seminars." As the Justice conceives of the function 
of our constitutional system, the role of the courts is to protect indi-
vidual rights and pronounce rules for others to follow. Courts examine 
statutory text to say what the law is, not what they would like it to 
be. Congress must learn that if it does not like the rule of absolute 
deference to administrative agencies when statutory language is am-
biguous, it should write clearer, more precise laws as the Constitution 
requires. Environmentalists unhappy about court rulings that seem 
to moor statutory provisions in the past should ask Congress to 
change the laws. Problems experienced by the public with adminis-
trative agencies should be remedied by elections. From all this, the 
constitutionally proper social order will emerge. It is, however, a 
social order of the past. As Dean Edelman remarked: 
Justice Scalia's world is one that did most definitely exist in the 
past but had changed quite considerably over the last half century 
in particular, although not completely by any means. The question 
about his jurisprudence is not whether it will take us back in time. 
That is obvious. The question is how far he really means to go if 
he can garner the votes to do SO.209 
IV. THE SWEET HOME LITIGATION 
A. Introduction to the Endangered Species Act 
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973210 is "the most compre-
hensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever 
enacted by any nation."211 The statute has as its purpose the conser-
vation of plants and animals threatened with extinction, and the eco-
systems upon which they depend.212 The Act defines "conserve" and 
"conservation" to include the use of all methods and procedures nec-
essary to bring protected species to the point at which the measures 
provided by the Act are no longer required.213 The Act requires re-
covery and restoration as well as protection of species in danger of 
extinction.214 
209 Edelman, supra note 203, at 1815. 
210 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). 
211 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2413 
(1995) (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978». 
212 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
213 [d. § 1532(3). 
214 See id. 
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The legislative history of the ESA indicates that Congress consid-
ered ecosystem conservation to be "basic" and "essential," a goal to 
which the statute's other purposes were "allied."215 Congress further 
recognized that habitat destruction is both "the most significant" 
threat to species and the "most difficult to control."216 Remarkably for 
1973, Congress pronounced the ecological principle that "everything 
is connected to everything else" as "nothing more than cold, hard 
fact."217 
The ESA accomplishes its goals in a number of ways. It authorizes 
the Secretary of the Interior, in cooperation with the states, to acquire 
land to aid in conserving imperiled species.218 The Act directs the 
Secretary of the Interior to list species that are endangered or threat-
ened according to certain criteria219 and to define their critical habi-
tats.220 Once listed, species are entitled to the full range of protections 
provided by the Act.221 
Federal agencies are given considerable responsibility for protect-
ing and restoring listed species. In addition to the obligation to con-
serve species, each federal agency must "consult" with the Secretary 
of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce222 to "insure that any 
216 H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 6, 10 (1973), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. 
WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
OF 1973 AS AMENDED IN 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 & 1980, 140, 145, 149 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY]. 
216 [d. In Sweet Harne, the United States Supreme Court cited the statutory purpose of 
ecosystem conservation as an important reason for its approval of the FWS's definition of harm 
to species as including habitat damage. See 115 S. Ct. at 2413. For a discussion of the relationship 
between ecosystem conservation and species protection, as well as the evolution of the "harm" 
standard, see Kevin D. Batt, Comment, Above All, Do No Harm: Sweet Home and Section Nine 
of the Endangered Species Act, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1177 (1995). It is Mr. Batt's position that 
Congress intended ecosystem conservation to serve not only as a means to protect species, but 
also as an end in its own right. See id. at 1182. 
217 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 215, at 145. 
218 16 U.S.C. § 1534(9). In Sweet Home, Justice Scalia concluded that this Section, not the 
prohibition on takings in 16 U.S.C. § 1538, represents Congress's solution to the problem of 
habitat destruction on private lands. See 115 S. Ct. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
219 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c). 
22Q [d. §§ 1533(a)(3)(A), 1533(b)(2); see also 50 C.F.R. § 17.11-12 (1995). 
221 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
222 [d. § 1536(a). The Department of the Interior and the Department of Commerce share 
authority under the Endangered Species Act. See id. § 1533(a), (b). DOl has primary responsi-
bility for implementing the Act. See id. § 1532(15). The FWS, within DOl, has jurisdiction over 
terrestrial and fresh water species, and shares jurisdiction over anadromous fish with the 
Department of Commerce, specifically the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) within 
the Department of Commerce. See id. § 1532(16). The Department of Commerce has jurisdiction 
over marine mammals and other maritime species. See id. 
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action authorized, funded or carried out by such agency . . . is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence" of any listed species "or 
result in the destruction or adverse modification of' its critical habi-
tat.223 Through the consultation process, the Department of the Inte-
rior's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) evaluates the potential impacts 
of an agency's proposed action on the affected species.224 The FWS 
issues an opinion describing those effects.225 If the FWS concludes 
that the action may jeopardize a listed species, it proposes "reasonable 
and prudent alternatives" that will avoid this result.226 After consult-
ation, the final decision about whether to proceed with the action lies 
with the agency.227 The FWS has no veto authority over agency con-
duct.22B 
B. "Taking" Under The ESA 
The duty to protect listed species is not limited to the federal 
agencies alone. At issue in Sweet Home was the proper interpretation 
of Section 9 of the ESA which makes it "unlawful for any person 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to ... take any [en-
dangered] species .... "229 This prohibition is one of the few nearly 
absolute commandments in environmentallaw.230 It appears to admit 
of no exception.231 The prohibition applies to everyone, public official 
and private citizen alike.232 It applies everywhere, reflecting Con-
gress's intent that the protections provided by the Act follow the 
223 Id. § 1536(a)(2). Critical habitat is defined by 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) as "specific areas ... 
on which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the 
species and (II) which may require special management considerations or protection .... " 
224 Id. § 1536(b)(3)(a). 
225 Id. 
226 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (b)(3)(a). 
227 Id. § 1536(b)(4). 
228 Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir. 1988); National Wildlife Fed'n 
v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). Of course, a federal 
agency that disregards a jeopardy opinion is subject to the prohibition against the taking of 
protected species. See Coleman, 529 F.2d at 375. 
229 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(I)(B). 
230 Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the Prohibitions Against Takings in Section 9 of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973: Learning to Live with a Powerful Species Protection Law, 62 
U. COLO. L. REV. 109, 199 (1991). 
231 A limitation on the "take" prohibition was added by amendment in 1982. Section 10(a)(I)(B) 
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to permit a taking, "if such taking is incidental to, and 
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(I)(B). 
232 The term "person" is defined by Section 3 of the Act to mean private individuals and 
corporations, as well as officers, employees, agents, departments and agencies of government 
at the federal, state and local level. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13). 
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species wherever they travel or live, even on private lands. Violations 
of the taking ban may result in civil or criminal penalties.233 
"Take" is defined by the ESA as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in 
any such conduct."234 The Act does not explicitly include destruction 
or modification of the habitat of protected species in the definition of 
prohibited taking activities. Habitat protection is provided through 
designation of critical habitat,2.'15 and by federal land acquisition.236 
C. The Fish and Wildlife Service Regulation 
In 1975, the FWS, of the Department of the Interior, issued a 
regulation defining "harm" within the definition of "take" to include 
injury to listed species resulting from habitat destruction or modifica-
tion. 
"Harm" in the definition of "take" in the Act means an act or 
omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts 
which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essen-
tial behavioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, 
breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmental modifica-
tion or degradation which has such effects is included within the 
meaning of "harm."237 
The regulation was determined by the FWS to be "necessary for 
proper implementation of the Act" and "a reasonable response to the 
habitat needs of listed species.''238 "Congress specifically acknowledged 
these needs by stating in the 'Purposes' subsection of the Act: 'The 
purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems 
upon which endangered and threatened species depend may be con-
served."'239 The FWS emphasized that potential restrictions on habi-
tat modification would be limited to those activities causing actual 
death or injury to members of a protected species of wildlife.240 
233 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)-(b). 
234 [d. § 1532(19). 
235 [d. § 1533(a)(3), (b)(2). 
236 [d. § 1534. 
237 Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 
44,416 (1975) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995». 
233 [d. at 44,413. 
239 [d. 
240 [d. 
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D. Prelude to Sweet Home 
The FWS regulation was first used to challenge activities that 
resulted in damage to the habitat of threatened and endangered spe-
cies in 1979. In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural 
Resources (Palila l), the United States District Court for the District 
of Hawaii directed the State of Hawaii to remove feral goats from the 
critical habitat of the Palila, an endangered species of bird.241 The 
court ruled that the defendants had "taken" Palila birds, in violation 
of the Act, by allowing the goats to eat mamane and naio trees, 
essential to the birds' survival.242 The court reached its ruling on the 
basis of evidence concerning the status of the Palila population.243 It 
did not require plaintiffs to prove actual bird death or injury, finding 
that "Congress has determined that protection of any endangered 
species anywhere is of the utmost importance to mankind, and that 
the major cause of extinction is destruction of habitat."244 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's injunction, ruling that the FWS regulation was 
consistent with the purposes and legislative history of the statute.245 
In 1981, in reaction to what it viewed as an overly broad application 
of the regulation in Palila I, the FWS amended the regulation "to 
eliminate the confusion that commentators and the courts have had 
with the present definition" and to limit more narrowly the meaning 
of "harm."246 The FWS claimed that the old definition contained a 
"significant ambiguity" that rendered it inconsistent with the intent 
of Congress in enacting the ESA.247 
If the words "such effects" are read to refer to the phrase ["]sig-
nificant disruption of essential behavioral patterns,["] then any 
significant environmental modification or degradation that dis-
rupts essential behavioral patterns would fall under the definition 
of harm, regardless of whether an act killing or injuring of wildlife 
is demonstrated. Under such an interpretation, a showing ofhabi-
241 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila l), 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 
1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). 
242 [d. at 995. 
243 See id. at ~9. 
244 [d. at 994-95. 
245 Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1981). 
246 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,490, 29,490 (1981). 
247 [d. 
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tat modification alone would be sufficient to invoke the criminal 
penalties of Section 9 .... [S]uch a result is inconsistent with the 
intent of Congress.248 
The new definition of "harm" became: 
An act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may in-
clude significant habitat modification or degradation where it ac-
tually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential 
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.249 
521 
In explaining the amended regulation, the FWS emphasized that it 
was not the Agency's intent to confine "harm" to direct physical injury 
to individual members of wildlife species.250 The purpose of the re-
definition was to preclude a claim of a taking from habitat modification 
alone, without any attendant death or injury to protected wildlife.251 
In 1986, the plaintiffs in Palila I moved to reopen the case to 
consider the impact of mouflon sheep on Palila habitat.252 The United 
States District Court of the District of Hawaii held that the amended 
definition of "harm" did not require plaintiffs to establish death or 
injury to individual members of the species.253 Rather, a showing of 
harm to the species as a whole through habitat destruction or modifica-
tion would suffice.254 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that 
impairment of essential behavioral patterns by depleting the Palila's 
sources of food and shelter constituted "harm" under the ESA.255 The 
appellate court supported its decision by reference to the broad pur-
poses of the ESA and to legislative history in Senate and House 
Reports that expressed Congress's intent to define "take" in "the 
broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which 
a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."256 
248 Id. 
249 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995). 
250 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981). 
251 See generally id. 
252 See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources (Palila II), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 
(D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
253 See id. at 1077. 
254 See id. 
255 See Palila V. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988). 
256 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 93--307, at 7 (1973), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra 
note 215, at 300, 306). 
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Following the Palila cases, a number of other courts applied the 
FWS definition of harm to various kinds of habitat modification.257 
Perhaps the most significant of these cases for understanding Sweet 
Home is Sierra Club v. Yeutter, in which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit enjoined the United States Forest Serv-
ice from clear cutting timber within 1200 meters of endangered red 
cockaded woodpecker colonies.258 The court held that the timber har-
vest harmed the birds by interfering with their breeding, and by 
damaging nesting and foraging habitat.259 
Although both Palila and Yeutter involved public land, the court in 
each case held that management activities carried out for private 
purposes could be enjoined as harmful to protected species.260 The 
implication for private landowners was clear. 
E. Sweet Home in the Lower Courts 
Rather than wait for a suit by environmental organizations to en-
join timber harvest in the habitat of the Northern spotted owl, a 
coalition of small timber companies, trade associations, and "timber 
dependent" families called Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for 
a Greater Oregon challenged the validity of the FWS regulation on 
its face.261 They argued that, by establishing habitat modification as a 
form of harm, the regulatory definition of "take" went far beyond the 
meaning intended by Congress.262 Plaintiffs further claimed that the 
FWS restrictions on logging in the habitat of the Northern spotted 
owl, and other listed forest dependent species such as the red cock-
aded woodpecker, injured them economically by reducing the timber 
supply, thereby causing a loss of their livelihood.263 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
applying the Chevron rule, upheld the FWS regulation as entirely 
257 See Cheever, supra note 230, at 162 n.318; James Tyler Moore, Babbitt v. Sweet Horne 
Chapter of Communities for a Greater Oregon: Defining "Harm" Under Section 9 of the 
Endangered Species Act, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 81, 83 n.1O (1995). 
258 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260, 1268 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club 
v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). 
259 Id. at 1271-72. 
260 See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 439 (5th Cir. 1991). 
261 Sweet Horne Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or. v. Lujan, 806 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 
1992). 
262 See id. at 283. 
263 See id. at 282. 
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consistent with the ESA's definition of "take."264 The court concluded 
that "the language, structure and history of the ESA reveal that 
Congress intended an expansive interpretation of the word 'take,' an 
interpretation that encompasses habitat modification."265 The court 
added that, even if it were "somehow to find the ESA 'silent or 
ambiguous' with respect to this issue, it would nevertheless uphold 
the [agency's] regulation as a reasonable interpretation" of the statu-
tory provision.266 
After extensive consideration of the Act's legislative history, the 
district court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the Senate did not 
intend "take" to encompass habitat modification because it did not 
report out one of the original versions of the statute that explicitly 
included habitat modification in the "take" definition.267 The court also 
rejected plaintiffs' argument that Congress intended to address habi-
tat modification only through federal land acquisition.268 The court 
found it "worth noting" that although Congress was aware of the 
court decisions upholding the FWS interpretation of "harm" when it 
amended the ESA in 1982, it chose not to correct that interpretation 
or to delete "harm" from the definition of "take."269 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit initially affirmed the district court, ruling that the 
"harm" regulation did not violate the ESA by including activities that 
modify habitat among prohibited takings.27o Judge Mikva observed 
that it was logical to assume that Congress must have intended to 
include habitat damage within the meaning of "take." 
It is hard to construct a legislative scenario in which Congress 
would have avoided the problem of habitat modification when it 
crafted the ESA. The drafters of the statute realized that the 
degradation of habitats posed one of the gravest threats to the 
continued existence of endangered and threatened species.271 
Judge Williams agreed with the outcome, but only because the 1982 
amendments which authorized the FWS to issue permits for "inciden-
264 See id. at 285. 
265Id. 
266 Sweet Home, 806 F. Supp. at 285. 
267 See id. at 283. 
268 See id. at 284. 
269Id. 
270 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 1 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993). 
271 Id. 
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tal" taking of protected species supported the inference that the ESA 
otherwise forbids such takings, including takings through habitat 
modifications.272 
Judge Sentelle dissented, also invoking Chevron.273 He found no 
ambiguity in the ESA sufficient to justify the FWS regulation. "I 
cannot cram the agency's huge regulatory definition into the tiny 
crack of ambiguity Congress left."274 To define "harm" as broadly as 
the agency did would be to render all other words in the statutory 
definition superfluous, in violation ofthe presumption against surplus-
age.275 
Apparently, Judge Williams was uncertain about his initial conclu-
sions as to the scope of the 1982 amendments. On rehearing, he 
reversed his earlier decision and joined with Judge Sentelle to invali-
date the FWS regulation, this time ruling that the Agency's definition 
of "harm" "was neither clearly authorized by Congress nor a 'reason-
able interpretation' of the statute" under Chevron.276 
The FWS had referred to "harm" as "the most elastic" of the words 
used to define prohibited actions under the ESA.277 The new majority 
feared the potential implications of this elasticity, given the civil and 
criminal penalties imposed on private individuals for taking protected 
species. It relied on the principle of noscitur a sociis (a word is known 
by the company it keeps), a canon of statutory construction "wisely 
applied" where a word that has many meanings could be used to give 
unintended breadth to an act of Congress.278 Because all other words 
in the "take" definition "contemplate ... the direct application of force 
against the animal taken," the court of appeals limited the meaning 
of "harm" to "the basic model 'A hit B."'279 
The D.C. Circuit found that the structure and history of the ESA 
confirmed its restricted reading of the definition, and indicated Con-
gress's intent to place primary responsibility for habitat protection on 
the government.280 The court determined that the Act's conservation 
272 See id. at 11. 
273 See id. at 12 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (invoking Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984». 
274Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
275 See Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
276 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 17 F.3d 1463, 1464 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
277 See id. 
278 See id. at 1465. 
279 See id. 
280 Id. at 1466. 
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purposes are to be achieved through three mechanisms: land acquisi-
tion by federal agencies, strict obligations on federal agencies to avoid 
adverse impacts to listed species, and the prohibition on taking of 
endangered species by anyone.281 
The court of appeals supported its construction of the statute with 
statements from the floor managers of the bill which became the 
ESA.282 It also saw the deletion of habitat modification from the defini-
tion of "take" in the version of the bill reported to the Senate from 
the Commerce Committee as a clear indication of congressional in-
tent.283 Finally, the court of appeals rejected arguments that Congress 
implicitly ratified the FWS regulation in 1982 by its failure to change 
the Agency's definition of harm. "[I]t is at best treacherous to find in 
congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law."284 
Calling the majority's decision "unfortunate,"285 Judge Mikva, now 
the lone dissenter, stated that the decision "scuttles a carefully con-
ceived Fish and Wildlife Service regulation" and "jettison[s] the Chev-
ron standard."286 According to Judge Mikva, the majority turned the 
Chevron analysis on its head by requiring the FWS to demonstrate 
that its definition of "harm" was clearly authorized by the ESA or a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute. 
Chevron does not place the burden on a responsible agency to 
show that its interpretation is clearly authorized or reasonable. 
On the contrary, the burden is on the party seeking to overturn 
such an interpretation to show that Congress has clearly spoken 
to the contrary or that the agency's interpretation is unreason-
able.287 
Judge Mikva also chided the majority for substituting its own "favor-
ite reading" of the ESA for that of the Agency, again contrary to 
Chevron.288 Once the court determined that the statute was not clear 
as to whether "harm" includes "significant habitat modification that 
actually kills or injures wildlife," the only question was whether the 
FWS's interpretation constituted a reasonable reading of the ambigu-
281 Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1466. 
282 [d. at 1466--67. 
283 [d. at 1467. 
284 [d. at 1469 (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946». 
285 [d. at 1473. 
286 Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1473. 
287 [d. 
288 [d. at 1474. 
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ous language.289 Whether it was the majority's preferred interpreta-
tion was irrelevant.290 
F. Sweet Home in the Supreme Court 
Faced with a split in the circuits caused by the differing outcomes 
of Palila and Sweet Home, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
Sweet Home case. In a six-to-three decision, the Court reversed the 
D.C. Circuit, ruling that the FWS had not exceeded its authority 
under the ESA by defining "harm" to include habitat modification.291 
The majority found that the text of the ESA provided three reasons 
for ruling that the Agency's interpretation is reasonable. First, the 
"ordinary understanding" of the word "harm" includes indirect in-
jury.292 Second, the broad purposes of the ESA make it logical to 
extend the Act's protection against activities that cause the kinds of 
harms that Congress enacted the statute to avoid.293 Third, the 1982 
amendments to the ESA authorizing the FWS to issue permits for 
"incidental taking"294 indicated that Congress understood "harm" to 
include indirect as well as direct takings.295 
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' ruling that "harm" 
must be limited to the direct application of force because the other 
words in the definition of "take" are similarly limited. It found that 
several words in the list, for example, ''harass,'' "pursue" and "wound," 
do not require direct application of force.296 The Court also held that 
if "harm" has essentially the same function as the other words in the 
definition, it becomes superfluous and deprived of its independent 
meaning, contrary to the canon of statutory construction that statu-
tory interpretation should not render words surplusage.297 The statu-
289 Id. at 1473-74. 
290 Id. at 1471. 
291 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Greater Or., 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2416 
(1995). 
292 See id. at 2412-13. In the context of the ESA, said the Court, the definition "naturally 
encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to members of endan-
gered or threatened species." Id. 
293 Id. at 2413-14. The majority quoted Thnnessee Valley Authority v. Hill in which the Court 
called the ESA "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species 
ever enacted by any nation." Id. at 2413 (quoting Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 180 (1978». 
294 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(I)(B) (1994). 
290 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414. 
296 See id. at 2414-15. 
297 Id. at 2415. 
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tory context of "harm" indicated to the Supreme Court that Congress 
intended it "to serve a particular function in the ESA, consistent with 
but distinct from the functions of the other verbs used to define 
'take."'298 
The Court was not convinced that the land acquisition authority of 
Section 5 and Section 7's mandate to federal agencies to avoid adverse 
modification of critical habitat were intended to be the exclusive 
references to habitat protection in the ESA.299 The Court noted that 
Sections 5, 7 and 9 set forth distinct responsibilities and obligations 
that are not replicated in the other sections.3°O Section 7 applies only 
to federal agencies, while Section 9 applies to "any person."30! Section 
7 imposes on federal agencies an affirmative duty to avoid adverse 
modification of critical habitat that Section 9 does not.302 The land 
acquisition authority of Section 5 allows for habitat protection before 
activities have harmed any endangered animal, whereas the govern-
ment cannot enforce the Section 9 prohibition unless harm can be 
demonstrated.303 
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority, principally because 
the respondents had made a facial challenge to the regulation.304 Her 
concurrence was based on two "understandings": (1) that the regula-
tion was limited in application to actions that actually kill or injure 
protected animals, and (2) that the regulation was limited in applica-
tion to habitat modification that was the proximate cause of death or 
injury.305 On both of these, Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice 
Scalia.306 
To reach its substantive conclusions the Supreme Court relied on 
the standard of review provided by Chevron.307 Under step one of the 
Chevron analysis, it found that Congress had not "unambiguously 
manifest[ed]" its intent to restrict "harm" to the direct application of 
force against a member of a protected species.308 Under step two, it 
determined that the FWS's interpretation of the statutory language 
298 [d. 
299 See id. at 2415--16. 
300 Sweet H0'YYU3, 115 S. Ct. at 2415--16. 
301 [d. at 2415. 
300 [d. 
303 [d. 
304 See id. at 2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
3G6 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2418. (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
306 [d. (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
307 [d. at 2416. 
308 [d. 
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was reasonable.309 The Court supported its ruling with the legislative 
history of the statute, particularly the 1982 amendment that gave the 
Agency the authority to permit "incidental" takings.310 The history of 
this amendment, said the Court, "focused squarely on the aspect of 
the 'harm' regulation at issue in this litigation."311 
The Court also noted that in the ESA Congress delegated particu-
larly broad administrative and interpretive powers to the FWS. 
The task of defining and listing endangered and threatened spe-
cies requires an expertise and attention to detail that exceeds the 
normal province of Congress ... Fashioning appropriate stand-
ards for issuing permits under § 10 . . . for takings that would 
otherwise violate § 9 necessarily requires the exercise of broad 
discretion. The proper interpretation of a term such as "harm" 
involves a complex policy choice.312 
For these reasons, the Court concluded, "the text, structure, and 
legislative history of the ESA" support the conclusion that the Agency 
reasonably construed the intent of Congress when it defined harm to 
include habitat modification that actually kills or injures wildlife.313 
V. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT 
Justice Scalia delivered a stinging dissent in Sweet Home, on behalf 
of himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas. It begins 
with a paragraph of vintage Scalia prose in which he lambasts the 
majority for imposing "unfairness to the point of financial ruin-not 
just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land 
conscripted to national zoological use."314 
With that rousing start to get the majority's attention, Justice 
Scalia identified three features of the FWS's regulation that violate 
the ESA. First, the regulation prohibits habitat damage that is the 
cause in fact, rather than the proximate cause, of death or injury to 
wildlife.315 Second, the regulation applies to "omissions" as well as 
acts, and third, harm is not limited to direct physical injury to indi-
vidual members of a protected species, but encompasses injury inflicted 
309 Id. 
310 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2417. 
311 I d. at 2418. 
312Id. 
313Id. 
314Id. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
316 See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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upon populations.316 None of these features of the regulation is found 
in the statutory language supposed to authorize it, and, therefore, the 
regulation's effect could not have been intended by Congress.317 
Perhaps to tweak the majority even further, Justice Scalia an-
nounced that he would assume that the Court was correct to apply 
Chevron, because the FWS regulation had to fail, even under the 
majority's rule.318 Justice Scalia proclaimed that Congress was "un-
mistakably clear" in expressing its intent that the prohibition on 
taking in Section 9 of the ESA apply only to the hunting and killing 
of endangered animals and that habitat protection be achieved solely 
through federal land acquisition.319 Consequently, the FWS's interpre-
tation of the statutory provision was entitled to no deference, whether 
it was reasonable or not.320 . 
To reach this conclusion, Justice Scalia followed the process he 
outlined in other opinions as proper under step one of the Chevron 
rule. He looked for Congress's intent by: (1) analyzing the ordinary 
meaning of the text, both alone and in the context of the ESA and the 
traditions of the body of wildlife law into which it fits, and (2) consid-
ering the policy consequences of the Agency's construction to see 
whether that construction would produce an absurd or unintended 
result.321 Through this method Justice Scalia articulated a generalized 
rule for future interpretation of the taking prohibitions of the ESA.322 
1. Text and Tradition 
Justice Scalia found no textual support for the "radically different" 
interpretation of the term ''take'' approved by the COurt.323 He stressed 
that the ordinary meaning of "take," according to both historic and 
current usage, requires "affirmative conduct intentionally directed 
against a particular animal or animals."324 Justice Scalia further de-
clared that even if "take" were not defined by the ESA "none could 
dispute what it means, for the term is as old as the law itself."325 It 
316 See id. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
317 See id. at 2421-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
318 See id. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
319 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
320 See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
321 See id. at 2424-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
322 See id. at 2421, 2430, 2431 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
323 See id. at 2431 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
324 See id. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
325 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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means "to reduce [wild] animals, by killing or capturing, to human 
control."326 Justice Scalia supported his claim with references to the 
Digest of Justinian ,327 Blackstone's Commentaries, international trea-
ties, various dictionaries, and other federal wildlife laws.328 He said 
that these authorities establish that "take" is "a term of art deeply 
embedded in the statutory and common law concerning wildlife [and] 
describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly and intentionally 
(not indirectly and by accident) to particular animals (not populations 
of animals)."329 
"Harm" is subordinate to and limited by the historic and common 
meaning of "take," Justice Scalia concluded, because it has no legal 
force of its own.330 "Take" is the only "operative" term in the stat-
ute, despite the majority's efforts to treat "harm" as a self-executing 
prohibition.33l Furthermore, "harm" is only one of ten prohibitory 
words in the definition; the other nine accompanying it fit the "ordi-
nary meaning" of "take" perfectly.332 All share the "sense of affirma-
tive conduct intentionally directed against a particular animal or ani-
mals."333 Justice Scalia dismissed as an "empty flourish" the statement 
in the legislative history that Congress intended to define "take" "in 
the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in 
which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."334 
Although Justice Scalia maintained that "take" has a universally 
known and accepted meaning, Congress did define it in the ESA, and 
patched together terms from a number of other wildlife statutes to 
do so. Tracking these terms back to their original sources dispels any 
idea of a commonly understood definition in wildlife law.335 A variety 
326 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
327 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the Digest of Justinian as relied upon in Geer v. Connecti-
cut, 161 U.S_ 519, 523 (1896». 
328 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
329 Id_ at 2422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
330 See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
331 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
332 Id. at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
333 Id. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
334 Id. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-307, at 7 (1973), reprinted in 1973 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2995). To Justice Scalia, such a statement merely says "'this statute means what 
it means all the way' [and] counts for little even when enacted into the law itself." Id. 
335 See Batt, supra note 216, at 1205. See generally Michael E. Field, The Evolution of the 
Wildlife Taking Conceptjrom Its Beginning to Its Culmination in the Endangered Species Act, 
21 Hous. L. REV. 457 (1984) (tracing origins of wildlife takings law from medieval times through 
the present). 
1997] SCALIA'S STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 531 
of formulations of "take" are used in the various statutes, each one 
probably reflecting distinct legislative intentions.336 None of the defini-
tions include "harm," lending weight to the conclusion that Congress 
intended a new and more expansive meaning of an old term.337 
Furthermore, if, as Justice Scalia claimed, "take" has a fixed, tradi-
tional meaning that "none could dispute," many of the verbs used to 
define it in the ESA are rendered surplusage in other wildlife stat-
utes. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, for example, makes it unlawful 
"to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, 
possess, [or] offer for sale" the birds subject to the Act.338 The Bald 
Eagle Protection Act defines "take" as "to pursue, shoot, shoot at, 
poison, wound, kill, capture, trap, collect, molest or disturb" eagles.339 
Under Justice Scalia's theory, if "take" simply means "to capture" or 
"kill," there was no need for Congress to include, either in the ESA 
or other wildlife statutes, any additional words describing direct ap-
plication of force to animals. 
2. Statutory Purposes and Context 
Justice Scalia rejected the majority's reliance on the broad purposes 
of the ESA as support for its ruling that the FWS's interpretation of 
harm is reasonable.340 According to Justice Scalia, purposes do not 
substitute for reading the language of the provision at issue.341 "Take," 
he argued, is limited to the meaning given by the words actually used 
to define it, as those words were ordinarily and customarily inter-
preted at the time the ESA was enacted, and as consistent with the 
structure of the statute as a whole.342 
Nor did Justice Scalia find the meaning given to "take" in the FWS 
regulation supported by the context of the ESA.343 In his view, the 
FWS definition is inconsistent with the use of the term throughout 
the statute.344 In Section 11(e)(4)(B), for example, Congress provided 
336 See generally Batt, supra note 216, at 1206--09 (surveying various statutes' definitions of 
"take" and the rationales behind those definitions). 
337 See id. 
338 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994). 
339 [d. § 668c (1994). 
340 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2426 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
341 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
342 See id. at 2425 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
343 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
344 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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for the forfeiture of "guns, traps, nets and other equipment" used in 
the taking of protected animals.345 If "take" meant habitat modifica-
tion, stated Justice Scalia, the list of equipment would have specified 
backhoes, plows, and bulldozers.346 
The broad structure of the statute further confirmed Justice Scalia's 
conclusion that the FWS regulation is unreasonable. He compared 
Section 7, which requires federal agencies to insure that their actions 
are not likely to result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
critical habitat, with Section 9, which contains no reference to habi-
tat.347 From such a comparison, Justice Scalia concluded that the explicit 
prohibition against habitat modification in Section 7 does not imply a 
similar prohibition in Section 9.348 Rather, when Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute, but omits it in another, 
the presumption is that Congress acted intentionally and purposely.349 
That presumption is even stronger when, as is the case in the ESA, 
Congress was careful to define and limit the application of the lan-
guage in the section where it appears.350 
Justice Scalia further stated that by defining "harm" to include 
habitat modification, the regulation makes the restriction on habitat 
modification in Section 7 almost wholly superfluous, contrary to the 
canon of construction that statutes should be read so far as possible 
to give effect to all their provisions.351 
In his discussion of habitat modification, Justice Scalia refused to 
accept that the term "habitat," as used in the FWS regulation, is not 
synonymous with the term "critical habitat" in Section 7 of the ESA.352 
"Critical habitat" refers to habitat determined by the Secretary of the 
Interior to be essential for the life functions of listed species.353 It is 
expressly not all the occupied or potential habitat of a listed species. 
The Secretary need not designate "critical habitat," if he determines 
that it is not possible or prudent to do so, and the Secretary may 
consider economic factors in deciding how much habitat to designate, 
if any.354 Federal agencies are charged with ensuring that their pro-
345 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2425 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(4)(B)). 
346 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
347 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2) with 1538(a)(1)(B)). 
348 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
349 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
350 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2425 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
351 [d. at 2426 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1636(a)(2)). 
352 [d. 
353 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). 
354 [d. § 1533(b )(2). 
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grams are "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction 
or adverse modification of critical habitat."355 This mandate is distinct 
from the FWS regulation's directive to avoid habitat damage, and 
more limited. 
As discussed in the first section of this article, Justice Scalia's 
unwillingness to consider legislative purposes to assist in statutory 
interpretation under the first step of Chevron conflicts sharply with 
the approach of his Supreme Court colleagues. Justice Stevens and 
others look to overall statutory purposes to explain or confirm the 
congressional intent of specific provisions. They believe that ignoring 
legislative goals in the interpretation of statutory text robs agencies 
of the flexibility that they need, and that Congress intends to provide 
in order to implement the core policies of a statute in new ways. 
Ignoring legislative goals also permits the particular language of parts 
of a statute to take precedence over the statute's fundamental pur-
poses, thereby distorting congressional intent. In the ESA, Justice 
Scalia's use of an out-dated definition of the term "take" virtually 
wipes out of the statute protection of species from the most significant 
cause of their decline. 
Obviously, Justice Scalia's approach ignores the political, and often 
disorderly, nature of the legislative process as well. Congress hardly 
acts as a single mind and body when preparing a piece of legislation, 
and sections of complex and lengthy statutes often lack clarity or 
consistency. Some of this is quite intentional. The statements of broad 
legislative purposes and goals included in a statute assist in clarifying 
and reconciling statutory sections. 
3. Policy Consequences 
Justice Scalia evaluated the policy consequences of the majority's 
insistence that the canon of noscitur a sociis should not be applied so 
as to deprive "harm" of its independent meaning. He maintained that 
this leads to absurd results in the ESA. "If it were true, we ought to 
give the word 'trap' in the definition its rare meaning of 'to clothe' ... 
since otherwise it adds nothing to the word 'capture."'356 
According to Justice Scalia, the FWS definition of "harm" leads to 
other, more significant, absurdities. "The verb 'harm' has a range of 
355 [d. § 1536(a)(2). 
356 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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meaning: 'to cause injury' at its broadest, 'to do hurt or damage' in a 
narrower and more direct sense."357 By defining "harm" as an act or 
omission that actually kills or injures a wildlife population through 
habitat modification, the FWS has chosen: 
a meaning that makes nonsense of the word that harm defines-
requiring us to accept that a farmer who tills his field and causes 
erosion that makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes 
oxygen and thereby "impairs [the] breeding" of protected fish, has 
"taken" or "attempted to take" the fish. It should take the strong-
est evidence to make us believe that Congress has defined a term 
in a manner repugnant to its ordinary and traditional sense.358 
For environmentalists, it is quite logical to assume that Congress 
did indeed intend the prohibition against harm to reach the farmer 
tilling his field. Ordinary, daily activities are often the most damaging 
to the ecosystems on which endangered species depend. The newspa-
pers abound with examples: the draining of wetlands that destroys 
their water filtering and cleansing functions; the construction of sub-
urban housing developments that eliminate animal travel corridors or 
breeding areas; domestic livestock grazing that starves out native 
species of wildlife that cannot compete for forage. To omit such activi-
ties from the ambit of the ESA, as Justice Scalia would, leaves a 
substantial hole in the Act's protective cover. 
For Justice Scalia, a further indication that policy considerations 
dictate against the FWS's interpretation of "harm" is that the civil 
penalty for unknowing acts could be read in conjunction with the 
regulation and applied to lawful, private land managing activities that 
result, unforeseeably, in wildlife damage.359 He could not imagine that 
a legislature could reasonably be thought to have intended such con-
sequences.360 
His colleagues disagreed with him that this is at all a likely outcome. 
The majority stated: 
357 [d. at 2423 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
358 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
359 See id. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
360 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The ESA provides that any person who ''knowingly'' violates the 
taking prohibitions of § 1538(a)(1)(B) is subject to criminal penalties under § 1540(b)(1) and civil 
penalties under § 1540(a)(1). See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1540(a)(1), 1540(b)(1). In addition, 
under § 1540(a)(1), any person "who otherwise violates" the taking ban may be assessed a civil 
penalty for each offense. See id. § 1540(a)(1). Justice Scalia is concerned that a person who 
"otherwise violates" the taking prohibition, i.e., violates it unknowingly, may be subject to 
substantial civil penalties, even for otherwise lawful activities necessary to making a daily living. 
See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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[I]n order to be subject to the Act's criminal penalties or the more 
severe of its civil penalties, one must "knowingly violat[e]" the 
Act or its implementing regulations .... The Act does authorize 
up to a $500.00 civil fine for "[a]ny person who otherwise violates" 
the Act or its implementing regulations. . . . That provision is 
potentially sweeping, but it would be so with or without the 
Secretary's "harm" regulation, making it unhelpful in assessing 
the reasonableness of the regulation.361 
535 
In any event, said the majority, the proper place to determine whether 
the civil penalty in Section 9 is improperly broad is a challenge to the 
enforcement of the provision itself, "not a challenge to a regulation 
that merely defines a statutory term."362 
Furthermore, as the majority discussed, Justice Scalia need not 
have decided that "take" did not include habitat damage in order to 
protect private property owners.363 The "incidental take" provisions364 
were added to the ESA in 1982 to address the conflict between efforts 
to protect endangered species and the interests of private property 
owners.365 These provisions provide a process for resolving such conflicts 
between the public interest in wildlife and property owners' interests 
in pursuit of economic gain.366 
4. Legislative History 
Although Justice Scalia is scornful of the use of legislative history 
as a tool to clarify congressional intent, particularly when "the en-
acted text is as clear as this,"367 in Sweet Home he assumed its utility 
in order to rebut the majority's claims. He quoted statements of the 
Senate and House floor managers of the bill as "direct evidence" that 
takings and habitat destruction on private lands were regarded as 
two separate problems to be addressed by two different sections of 
the ESA.368 In particular, he emphasized Senator Tunney's statement 
361 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2412 n.9 (citations ommitted). 
362 [d. 
363 [d. at 2414 n.13. 
364 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
365 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2417-18. As noted by Justice Stevens, the model for the 
incidental take provisions was provided by the habitat conservation plan developed to protect 
two species of endangered butterflies from the effects of a private housing development. See id. 
at 2418; see S. REP. No. 97-418, at 10 (1982); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 97-835, at 30-32 (1982); Batt, 
supra note 216, at 1216. 
366 See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2417-18. 
367 [d. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
368 [d. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
536 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 24:487 
that "[t]hrough [the] land acquisition provisions, we will be able to 
conserve habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further 
destruction."369 He also pointed to Congressman Sullivan's comment 
that "the principal threat to animals stems from destruction of their 
habitat .... [The bill] will meet this problem by providing funds for 
acquisition of critical habitat .... "370 
On their face these statements do not suggest that the taking 
prohibitions and the federal land acquisition program provisions were 
intended to be mutually exclusive. Justice Scalia appears to have 
assumed that the fledgling ESA's floor managers' references to land 
acquisition as a way to conserve habitats on private lands indicated 
that they meant it to be the only way to do so. There is no indication 
in the legislative history that this is the case. 
Justice Scalia's attempt to refute the majority's reliance on the 
legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the ESA is even more 
problematic. The amendments, which authorize the Secretary of the 
Interior to permit incidental taking, were enacted the year after the 
Secretary of the Interior promUlgated the current version of the FWS 
regulation. The majority concluded that the legislative history of the 
incidental take provision "strongly suggests that Congress under-
stood § 1538(a)(1)(B) to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate tak-
ings."371 
Justice Scalia first rejected the majority's analysis because habitat 
modification is not the only "otherwise lawful activity" that might 
cause a taking.372 For that reason, the Court could not reliably assume 
that Congress truly meant to include it. He followed this argument 
with a claim that illustrates his Chevron analysis and the approach to 
statutory interpretation considered in this article. Justice Scalia was 
faced with an interpretive obstacle that he could not get through, so 
he announced that the obstacle did not, indeed could not possibly, exist.373 
369Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 119 CONGo REC. 25,669 (1973)). 
37°Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 119 CONGo REC. 30,162 (1973)). 
371 See Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2414. 
372 Id. at 2428 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
373 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia had made such pronouncements before. In 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990), he announced that it was "impossible" 
for the National Wildlife Federation's standing affidavits to enable the Federation to challenge 
the Department of Interior program. It was not impossible, of course, since the district court 
and the court of appeals had considered the issue and concluded that the organization met the 
standing requirements of the United States Constitution. Similarly, in Defenders of Wildlife v. 
Lujan he decried the respondent's standing theories as "beyond all reason." 504 U.S. 555, 566 
(1992) 
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Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Senate Committee Report 
and the House Conference Committee Report "clearly contemplate" 
that the incidental take provision will enable the Secretary to allow 
habitat modification, but then refused to accept that the language of 
the amendment means what it says. 
[T]he text of the amendment cannot possibly bear that asserted 
meaning, when placed within the context of an Act that must be 
interpreted ... not to prohibit private environmental modifica-
tion. The neutral language of the amendment cannot possibly 
alter that interpretation, nor can its legislative history be sum-
moned forth to contradict, rather than clarify, what is in its total-
ity an unambiguous statutory text.374 
Justice Scalia's conclusion that the legislative history and the text 
of the 1982 amendments to the ESA cannot possibly change the plain 
meaning of the definition of "take" is the nub of his dissent. For him, 
the ESA never did, and never will prohibit damage to the habitat of 
protected species that results in harm to those species. Application of 
the proper methodology of statutory interpretation will not lead to 
that result. The FWS regulation defining harm to species to include 
alteration of their habitat is unreasonable for Justice Scalia because 
the plain meaning of "take" in the statute was carved in statutory 
stone in 1973. It is limited to the direct application of force against 
animals subject to the Act. Venerable historical sources, the common 
law and tradition, and the context of the ESA as a whole support his 
judgment. The legislative history cannot contradict the plain meaning 
of statutory language as determined by textual analysis. To accept 
the FWS's definition of harm would lead to absurd policy conse-
quences and deprive private landowners of rights to carry out other-
wise lawful activities. 
For Justice Scalia, because the statutory meaning is unmistakably 
clear, the FWS regulation prohibiting modification of the habitat of 
protected species that results in injury or death to members of those 
species is entitled to no deference under the Chevron rule, regardless 
of its longevity, the expertise of the agency, or whether it supports 
the overall purposes of the ESA. Habitat protection is to be accom-
plished only through land acquisition and constraints on federal ac-
tivities affecting critical habitat. Private property owners have lim-
ited obligations to wildlife. They may not "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or collect" endangered species, but 
374 Sweet Home, 115 S. Ct. at 2428 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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they may hurt or destroy them by damaging their homes, their food, 
and their shelter. 
Even in terms of Justice Scalia's own concept of "policy conse-
quences," such a result seems absurd. It ought to take "the strongest 
evidence" to indicate that Congress intended such an outcome. The 
ESA was passed to protect endangered species and the ecosystems 
on which they depend. Congress did not limit ecosystems to those 
under federal jurisdiction. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND ApPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED 
Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation and his formal-
istic application of the Chevron rule results in a fixation on a histori-
cally and socially isolated text that may not allow a rational interpre-
tation that reflects changed social, economic, or scientific understanding. 
His dissent in Sweet Home illustrates this fixation and its outcome. 
To be true to "tradition" in Sweet Home Justice Scalia argued for a 
construction of statutory language that makes no biological sense and 
would drastically limit the usefulness of the ESA to protect endan-
gered and threatened species and their habitats. In searching for 
rules, he confined an important legal concept to its ancient common 
law meaning, thereby hobbling federal efforts to stem the alarming 
loss of species resulting from the ordinary, habitat-damaging activi-
ties of human beings. By disconnecting the prohibition against harm 
to endangered species from the purposes of the ESA, he narrowed 
and distorted clearly expressed congressional intentions concerning 
the function of the statute in American society. 
Justice Scalia may not care about the substantive outcome of his 
decisions as long as the other branches of government learn the 
lessons he is attempting to teach, but environmentalists who work to 
protect the nation's dwindling natural resources care a great deal. 
Much more is at stake than abstract legal principles. Justice Scalia's 
philosophy has significant consequences in application, as Sweet Home 
amply illustrates. It is important, therefore, for environmental law-
yers to understand his methodology and approach so that cases reach-
ing the Supreme Court can be constructed strategically for the best 
chance of success. Next time environmentalists meet Justice Scalia in 
a case involving statutory interpretation or the application of the 
Chevron doctrine, they would be wise to focus their arguments on the 
plain meaning of the statutory language, as supported by the context 
and tradition of the law in which it fits. They should avoid scientific 
rationales for interpreting statutes that reflect new understandings 
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of ecological principles. Justice Scalia is not interested in biology, 
except if it can be shown that Congress was as well. Environmental 
lawyers certainly should not claim that deference is owed to a long-
standing agency interpretation, or plead for the Court to speak for 
creatures that cannot speak for themselves. That might play in New 
Haven (or South Royalton, Vermont), but not in the halls of the 
Supreme Court. 
Nor will it do for environmental lawyers to argue to Justice Scalia 
that courts must monitor agencies or step in to supply appropriate 
policy choices when Congress is ambiguous. The best strategy is to 
demonstrate that the analysis of the statutory text leads to the result 
being sought, either because Congress intended it, or if congressional 
intent is not clear, because the agency that Congress entrusted to 
implement the statute has made a permissible construction of the 
statutory provision. 
It may be, as some have suggested, that the environment will never 
win when Justice Scalia speaks for a Supreme Court majority, or that 
the words of a statute will mean whatever he wants them to mean in 
a particular case. My sense of the Justice, from the vantage point of 
engaging him across the bench when he was on the D.C. Circuit, is 
that he has a comprehensive and consistent philosophy which truly 
does guide his search for a decision.375 Justice Scalia probes deeply for 
the answers to the questions presented in cases. His caustic tone and 
sometimes outrageous declarations obscure how carefully he hews to 
his method of statutory interpretation. He truly believes that his job 
as a judge is to interpret the plain meaning of statutory language, not 
to substitute his policy preferences or enthusiasms for those of the 
publicly elected legislature. It is not his job to care. Only when the 
legislature is ambiguous is deference to administrative interpreta-
tions of law appropriate. The rule of law is a law of rules. Lawyers 
who understand Justice Scalia's philosophy and method and are able 
to respond to it will be better prepared to argue for environmental 
protection in the Supreme Court. They may even find him on their 
side. 
375 The author argued before Justice (then Judge) Scalia in Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 
1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
